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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that “coercive” counterinsurgency (COIN) has played a larger role 
historically than is currently recognized in today’s FM 3-24 doctrine, which reflects the 
popular view of COIN as emphasizing protection of the population. The extent to which 
the essence of COIN has been misunderstood and misinterpreted, undermining the 
coercive “gold standard” is a central concern. While there has been some recognition of 
the utility of coercive action against insurgents, ethical concerns about proportionality 
and the indiscriminate use of force have imposed constraints. Where the “gold standard” 
represents deliberate, strict coercion against the population, FM 3-24 emphasizes a far 
more limited coercive approach, one that may be to the detriment of COIN operations as 
understood in historical perspective.    
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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ON COIN DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION  
David Galula once wrote, “The profusion of variables in war has never 
discouraged the search for foolproof systems.”1 At times, however, the search has not 
necessarily been properly executed through an accurate assessment of history and 
geopolitics. How the United States has conceptualized and developed its 
counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine offers a case-in-point.2   
COIN lessons from the past were gleaned but not fully retained, mainly due to its 
“ill-fated association” with the Vietnam War.3 Instead, focus on conventional warfare via 
Air-Land Battle during the 1980s and ‘90s took precedence in strategic planning.4 Nearly 
a decade later, conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan created a déjà vu moment for the U.S.; 
insurgencies at first unwillingly acknowledged, but then embraced after a few years of 
denial. This time, there was an updated doctrine in 2006—one that arguably absorbed 
                                                 
1 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CN: Prager, 2006), xxi.  
2 Definitions: COIN, as defined by FM 3-24 are “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” United States Army, FM-3–24, Counterinsurgency ( Ft. 
Leavenworth, KN: Training and Doctrine Command, 2006). Doctrine is simply defined by Andrew as a “common 
orientation, language and conceptual framework… [that] helps soldiers navigate the fog of war.” Andrew Birtle, U.S.-
Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941 (Washington D.C.: United States 
Government Printing, November 1997), 5. This thesis also uses the term COIN with a broad-brush through history to 
also describe its other aliases like small war, overseas contingency, low intensity conflict LIC), revolutionary warfare, 
and people’s war.  
3 David Ucko, “Counterinsurgency and its Discontents: Assessing the Value of a Divisive Concept” SWP 
Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs April 2006, 5–21. For additional context, 
Janine Davidson provides a brief synopsis on the United States’ history of COIN: “Throughout its entire 250-year 
history, coin, stability operations, and nation building have been far from an “irregular” occurrence. The U.S. has 
conducted such missions—on a large scale—about every 25 years since the Mexican War in the 1840’s…Since the end 
of the Cold War, the U.S. has deployed every 18–24 months in response to complex crises of various size, with the 
average duration of these endeavors becoming increasingly protracted…Repeatedly, after each painful episode, the 
military has sought to avoid having to do them again by forgetting its doctrine and failing to plan, leaving the next 
generation to re-learn on the fly” [emphasis added]. See Janine Davidson, Dudes! Misrepresenting DoD’s Strategic 
Guidance Repeats Mistakes, Ignores Emerging Trends, and Leads to Failure.” The Best Defense, Foreign Policy 
Magazine, July 27, 2012.  
4 Gian Gentile, “A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects,” World Affairs, Summer 2008. This 
approach was arguably appropriate during the Cold War—where the military’s central mission was to counter the 
Soviet Union from prevailing in a decisive thrust across the Fulda Gap. 
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more public attention than any other previously published doctrine in U.S. history—
emphasizing nation-building and population-centric COIN.5  
Though this brought the military a long way back from its Vietnam amnesia, there 
have been concerns regarding the doctrine’s relevance and single-scoped approach to 
conducting 21st century COIN. Moreover, with more than a decade of grinding COIN 
warfare, economic austerity, and a strategic “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific and 
the proposed the concept of Air-Sea Battle, a new bout of COIN amnesia is potentially on 
the horizon, one that misrepresents or misinterprets history and thus has the potential to 
be ineffective.6  
B. PROBLEM  
The combat experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 have challenged the 
U.S. politically, strategically, and doctrinally for over a decade. The debate has evolved 
over time, but is increasingly centering on whether or not the current doctrine, Field 
Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, has been effective, and if not, where deficiencies 
exist and how they can be addressed. Recent endeavors have been mandated to address 
the perceived shortfalls at the doctrinal level.  
The U.S. Army (through its COIN Center at Ft. Leavenworth) is leading the effort 
to rewrite the COIN manual in order to resolve these issues. Beginning fall 2011, the 
project is scheduled to continue for over a year, with a tentative completion date of June 
                                                 
5 Among the critics of the doctrine’s nation-building construct is Andrew Birtle. He stated that “time and again, 
U.S. nation builders have seen transplanted American institutions wither in the infertile soils and inhospitable climates 
of foreign countries. Counterinsurgency and nation building theorists have all too often ignored this reality and have 
fallen into the culturally insensitive trap of trying to radically transform foreign societies--a task that is extremely 
difficult under the best of circumstances, if it is possible at all. Such a tack can also alienate the very country we are 
trying to help, as occurred often in Vietnam.” See Andrew Birtle, “Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency 
Warfare,” Military Review 88, no. 4 (2008): 52. 
6 See Captain Philip Dupree and Colonel Jordan Thomas, “Air-Sea Battle: Clearing the Fog,” Armed Forces 
Journal, June 2012. On June 2, 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Security 
Dialogue conference in Singapore that outlined U.S. fore ‘rebalancing’—previously labeled a “pivot” –toward the 
Asia-Pacific, and the Air-Sea Battle concept. As described by Captain Philip Dupree and Colonel Jordan Thomas, “Air-
Sea Battle seeks a better future—one that employs teamwork between air and naval forces to maintain U.S. superiority 
in the air, space and cyberspace, and at sea, at an acceptable cost, allowing the joint force to shape future A2/AD 
environments, deter other nations from threatening the global commons, and use all service and joint competencies to 
defeat a capable A2/AD adversary when necessary.”  
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2013.7 Specifically, the COIN Center is focused on producing a new field manual with an 
analytic framework dedicated to retaining historical lessons, while integrating the lessons 
garnered over the last ten years.8 As novel and necessary as this effort is for crafting and 
innovating U.S. COIN doctrine, there is substantiated risk that the historical accuracy 
may become diluted, or perhaps further diluted, than what FM 3-24 originally 
envisioned.  
The primary concern of this project is assessing its incorporation and accurate 
portrayal of the origin of the current doctrine, the best practices from 20th century 
European experience (the alleged “gold standard”), and its consistency and value for U.S. 
warfare. Where integrating contemporary lessons is crucial to future doctrine, how the 
historical lessons are and are not retained are also an imperative. The research question of 
this thesis is: Does the United States have an effective counterinsurgency doctrine that 
accurately reflects and retains historic experiences?  
C. HYPOTHESIS  
Lessons from British and French small war campaigns from the 20th century 
(with certain overlap from the 19th) are sacrosanct to the debate on what COIN approach 
is most effective.9 For instance, lessons from Algeria and Malaya are considered, in large 
part, to be the holy grail of how to properly undertake COIN campaigns through “hearts 
                                                 
7 See United States Army, “AIWFC Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell,” SITREP (Ft. Leavenworth, KN:  U.S. 
Army Counterinsurgency Center, July 18, 2011), 4. Also see January 20, 2012, iteration for draft timeline.   
8 United States Army, “AIWFC Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell.” SITREP (Ft. Leavenworth, KN, U.S. Army 
Counterinsurgency Center, August 23, 2011), 2–3. Also see United States Army. “Minutes from COIN Brownbag 
Webcast with LTC Paganini,” (Ft. Leavenworth, KN: United States Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army 
Counterinsurgency Center, August 18, 2011). LTC Paganini also indicated “that the revised version of FM 3-24, when 
completed, must be applicable globally with the scope and relevance from platoon to division level. The revised 
version will have more application, less theory, and enduring tactics with procedures in the appendences.”  
9 Prior and since the publication of FM 3-24, there has been a continuous debate among various camps in the 
military, think tank, and academic communities. The basic distinctions between these camps as follows: debate on 
whether to follow an enemy-centric or population centric approach; how COIN—regardless of approach—is affecting 
the organizational culture of the military to either the potential detriment of conventional force preparedness, or 
alternatively, loss of retention as had been the case post-Vietnam War; whether COIN can be a strategic concept, or is 
just a set of tactical means that must be guides by other strategic ends; and that the COIN doctrine has created, in the 
words of Bing West, “a culture of entitlement,” where As FM 3–24 states, “money is ammunition” and development 
projects have been meant to “buy loyalty and transform cultures. See Octavian Manea, Interview with Bing West in, 
“COIN—A Culture of Entitlement,” Small Wars Journal, December 20, 2011.     
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and minds” (HAM) and population protection.10 The pursuits of the scholars and 
practitioners in the mid-20th century—like Galula, Thompson, Trinquier, and 
Lacheroy—also went on to capture the central themes from crises that erupted at the end 
of World War II, where colonial powers were seriously challenged by their respective 
claims.11 These cases and authors have come to collectively encompass 20th century best 
practices—the “gold standard” of COIN—that supposedly had significant influenced in 
the 2006 published doctrine.12  
This thesis argues that despite their image, the above “gold standard” principles 
involve more coercion and strict control as “an integral and generic element in such 
conflicts,” as opposed to the softer, nation-building strategy interpreted as population-
centric COIN.13 The supposed limited-force HAM models of the British, and softened 
pacification model by the French during the 20th century, were actually calculated 
campaigns that entailed considerable brutality and deprivation against insurgents and 




                                                 
10 Many contemporary experts on COIN have cited 20th century European COIN experiences as examples of 
where the United States should derive lessons. See Nagl, John. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency 
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, (Chicago University Press. 2005); Robert M. Cassidy, “The British Army and 
Counterinsurgency: The salience of Military Culture.” Military Review 85 (May-June 2005): 53–59; John A. 
McConnell, “The British in Kenya (1952–1960): Analysis of a Successful Counterinsurgency Campaign,” thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005. 
11 Galula captures these lessons in his seminal work, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. 
(Westport, CN: Praeger, 2006). Another French authority on COIN, Roger Trinquier, describes the French 
Counterinsurgency experience in his book, Modern Warfare. He refers to “modern warfare” as an asymmetric 
environment where the “ideological power of a cause on which to base action” forces the counterinsurgent to create a 
concrete and powerful tangible, out of an intangible. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of 
Counterinsurgency (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2006).  
12 See United States Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Ft. Leavenworth, KN, 2006), xxiv. As Sarah Sewall 
notes in her forward to FM 3–24, the authors premised the 2006 doctrine “on principles learned during British early 
period of imperial policing and relearned during responses to 20th century independence struggles in Malaya and 
Kenya. It [also] incorporates insights from French COIN guru David Galula. [The doctrine, therefore,] adopts a 
population-centered approach instead of one focused on the insurgents. 
13 Ibid., 54.   
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often labeled today as “successes.”14 The representation of these approaches lacks a clear 
understanding of the true nature of those past conflicts and underappreciates the amount 
of resources and time necessary to conduct a similarly executed campaign. 
This thesis argues that the prevalence of coercion in COIN warfare has played a 
larger role historically than is currently recognized in today’s popular conceptualization 
of COIN. In fact, many of the revolutionary wars of the 20th century can be characterized 
just as brutal as any other.15 It further argues that U.S. COIN doctrine does not 
adequately recognize and account for the importance of coercion in COIN warfare.  
This analysis is particularly prudent provided the current revision of U.S. 
doctrine. If doctrine is to be based on historical lessons, as FM 3-24 has been claimed to 
be, there must be doctrinal clarity on the overriding levels of force and means used to 
control populations that have ultimately played a significant role in successfully 
conducting COIN in the 20th century. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Though factors such as political will, regime type, balance of power, 
technological innovation, and leadership are all important as to how, and under what 
circumstances, a state engages and prosecutes COIN, this thesis is only tangentially 
                                                 
14  Theories like those developed by General Raoul Salan and Colonel Charles Lacheroy in “la guerre 
revolutionnaire,” (providing the basis for the Doctrine of Revolutionary Warfare [DRW]), the Briggs Plan in Malaya 
during the early 1950s (where Sir Robert Thompson was directly involved). 
Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 
1948–60,” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, eds. Malkasian and Marston (Osprey: Oxford. 2008), 118–119. 
The Briggs Plan—which marked the turning point in British strategy in Malaya and based on a study done by Michael 
Calvert, the former Chindit Brigade Commander—presented similar core principles as had Lacheroy: first, was the 
systematic resettlement of all the ethnic Chinese that were on the periphery of the jungle and isolated areas; second, 
strengthening of the administration; collaboration between civil-military offices; forth, roads to e built in the more 
isolated areas of the country for a permanent presence to be established; and lastly, the army would maintain full 
control of areas that had been cleared. Lyttelton’s six-point plan around 1952: first, is the need for a unified direction of 
civil-military efforts; second, police must be retrained and reorganized; counter-propaganda campaign; resettled areas 
must be granted a high level of protection; home-guard must be reorganized with proper representation of Malayan 
Chinese; sixth, the strain on the civil service needed correction.  
15 Mao famously stated that power itself flows from the barrel of a gun; H.G. Summers solemnly declared that, “a 
war is a war is a war,” and British Major General Lloyd Wheaton wrote in 1900 that “You can’t put a rebellion down 
by throwing confetti and sprinkling perfumery.” Their collective message is clear on two points: first, the difference in 
conflict varies merely within context and scale, not the nature of power and war itself; second, that a state succeeds in 
large part by the barrel of a gun. See H.G. Summers Jr., “A War is a War is a War,” in Low-Intensity Conflict, ed. 
Loren B. Thompson (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books), 27–49. Also see Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s 
Empire in the Philippines (New York: Ballantine Books, 1979), 179. 
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concerned with such issues. Instead, the focus is on the formal and informal principles 
amassed as a result of the previous undertakings in 20th century COIN conflict.   
Defining what constitutes coercion and persuasion is important for similarities 
and differences between the “gold standard” and current U.S. COIN doctrine. First, 
coercion has generally been defined as the use of threats, deterrence or compellence to 
influence another’s behavior.16 Operationally and tactically speaking, this constitutes 
applying kinetic and control techniques that cause the adversary to stop, change, or 
prevent certain actions. Coercion, then, is an exercise of power over another person 
through threat or actual punishments. Brute force or the “stick,” as originally defined by 
Schelling, is where the “coercer credibly threatens the opponent that if the action in 
question is not stopped, or a desired action is not taken, force will be used to induce 
compliance.”17 Invoking pain and hurt on the opponent in such cases continues until 
adequate compliance is achieved. Punishments can also be psycho-social, as with public 
shaming, or involve malign neglect, as in the denial of food.  
In contrast, persuasion involves compelling desired behavior by offering some 
level of rewards. Positives incentive could include establishing social and political 
dialogue directly through the established construct, steady income, or development 
projects. These techniques have generally become known as “carrots,” rewards for 
exhibiting desired behavior. In practice, usually, the blending of coercive and persuasive 
measures through what can be described as carrots and sticks is essential.18 
                                                 
16 As described by Patrick Bratton, “When is Coercion Successful, and Why Can’t We Agree on it?” Naval War 
College Review 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005), 117. “This definition is a broad synthesis” throughout the literature. He cites 
a myriad of literature to support this assertion: Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1966), 2–6; Daniel Ellsberg, “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” in Bargaining: Formal Theories of 
Negotiation, ed. Oran Young (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1975), 344; Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” 
Strategic Coercion: Cases and Concepts, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 15; and 
Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military 
Might (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. 
17 Ibid. Also see Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, 79–80. 
18 Andrew Birtle, “Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Military Review 88, no. 4 (2008), 
45–53. Birtle espoused that “history has shown that there is no simple formula for combining these two essential yet 
volatile ingredients. Rather, counterinsurgency warfare has proved to be more alchemy than science, with each 
situation requiring a different proportion of ingredients, depending upon the social, political, cultural, and military 
nature of the conflict.” 
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With these definitions in mind, this thesis explores the ‘consistency’ and 
‘deviation’ of COIN doctrine through a comparative analysis of the alleged “gold 
standard” literature and U.S. COIN doctrine, FM 3-24. Cases from the 19th century are 
too far removed politically and strategically in that their focus on retaining active colonial 
power abroad does not correlate well with the U.S. experience. Though the respective 
European powers in 20th century were still imperial, their ultimate objectives were to 
transition security and authority to locals. The 21st century U.S. doctrine, which is 
premised behind the concept to assist a HN to foster its own security, and stability, 
represents a similar task. Moreover, given that “gold standard” cases have been described 
in the U.S. doctrine as areas where contemporary lessons and principles have been drawn, 
they offer the appropriate lens for discerning what shortfalls exist, and where those areas 
may be improved, or rethought. It appears that even though U.S. doctrine acknowledges 
the “gold standard,” however, the doctrine doesn’t accurately reflect the true nature of 
“gold standard” cases. 
The following questions structure this analysis:  
1) To what extent has the contemporary “gold standard” depiction of COIN—the 
experiences and theoretical frameworks found in the 20th century COIN 
literature—deviated from the methods actually used in the previous century?  
2) Which of these principles have been captured in U.S. doctrine, and which 
have been omitted? 
3) Can the U.S. achieve success following doctrine that distorts history? 
E. ROADMAP 
The first chapter offers a general overview of the relevance modern COIN 
doctrine garners in the 21st century. The chapter introduces the pertinent literature, core 
hypotheses, and the methodology to be applied in this study. The second chapter reviews 
historic writings and cases that allegedly reflect “gold standard” of COIN literature. How 
French counter-revolutionary warfare and British colonial police actions were carried out, 
and how closely these align with COIN doctrine attributed to them, have been gleaned; 
common principles and methods are extracted. The third chapter assesses the principles 
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listed in current U.S. doctrine. The forth chapter presents a comparative analysis between 
the “gold standard” and current U.S. doctrine, FM 3-24. The chapter will decipher the 
“consistency” and “deviation” that exists between the two sets of principles. The fifth 
chapter provides recommendations for how the doctrine or execution may need to be 
reconsidered or altered, as well as insights regarding future research to address 
unanswered questions revealed in the course of this research endeavor.  
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II. TARNISHED COIN? A REVIEW OF THE “GOLD 
STANDARD” 
The challenges of managing their respective far flung empires in the 20th century 
helped drive the British and French toward two different approaches: “imperial policing,” 
using indirect means in order to maintain economic and cultural hegemony; and “counter-
revolutionary war,” which sought to acquire a newfound political legitimacy for direct 
rule against the increasing threat from communist-based movements.19 This section 
outlines the principles distilled from these “gold standard” cases by those aforementioned 
core theorists and empirical cases that have been stated to have heavily influenced the 
current doctrine.20  
A. THE “GOLD STANDARD”: THEORY AND PRACTICE  
1. David Galula, the Acclaimed Sage of COIN  
David Galula is considered by many experts to be the preeminent scholar on 
COIN warfare. With combat experience spanning from conventional war in World War 
II, to the guerrilla wars in China, Greece, and Algeria, his credibility in the field is 
unchallenged. Contextually speaking, the timing of Galula’s writings was critical, 
considering the endeavor France had been undertaking to fully mobilize and address the 
challenges of countering revolutionary warfare in its territories.  
                                                 
19 Ibid., 240. The principle of minimum force was strengthened by changing attitudes in Britain towards violence: 
the Boer War, the Irish Troubles, and the massacre at Amritsar reflect this point. Ibid 26. Even as late as 1949 during 
the Palestine Conflict, for example, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery complained about restrictions of the British 
Army’s freedom to us force. In 1969, other complaints were heard from officers who claimed that greater force would 
have prevented the situation in Ireland from deteriorating. The recurring problem is that these conclusions can only be 
drawn in hindsight. 
20 United States Army, FM-3-24. Counterinsurgency, 37-43. The FM describes the following areas as the 
historical principles as the context of its doctrine: “legitimacy as the main objective, where consent and coercion dictate 
how a government may be perceived; unity of effort where interagency an joint coordination is essential; political 
factors are primary and must guide the military approach; counterinsurgents must understand the environment; 
intelligence drives operations through timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest 
possible level and disseminated throughout the force;” insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support; 
security under the rule of law is essential; and counterinsurgents must prepare for a long-term commitment.  
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In Galula’s acclaimed book Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice, he outlined 
three laws that encapsulate many of the tenants commonly found in 20th century COIN 
doctrine, as he viewed it:   
1) Support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as it is 
the insurgent. To achieve this end, the counterinsurgent must seek out the 
“active minority for the cause” and “a neutral majority” to derail the 
momentum of the insurgency. 
2) Support from a large portion of the population is conditional. In order to 
achieve this, the counterinsurgent must “demonstrate that he has the will, 
the means, and the ability to win.”  
3) Intensity of effort and vastness of means are essential.21  
To operationalize these in a campaign, Galula breaks down the process into three 
segments: re-establish authority; isolate the population from the insurgent by physical 
means; and gather intelligence for the elimination of insurgent political cells.22 Galula 
asserts that contact with the population is a delicate matter, but must be affirmed through 
requests, and if necessary, orders. Any orders given must be backed by ability and 
willingness to enforce compliance escalating on scale and as needed.  
Employment of force is critical to this endeavor. Galula explains that a grid of 
troops should be established to protect political teams, and mobile reserves must be 
positioned.23 Due to practical resource constraints in terms of troop numbers and the 
ability to control vast supply lines, Galula asserts that certain desolate and sparsely 
populated areas should be modified into “forbidden zones”—a predetermined and 
                                                 
21 Galula,. Counterinsurgency Warfare, 53. Though many implications of these laws go beyond pure military 
application (e.g., principles) and bleed into the political sphere (especially number 2, and to a certain extent, number 3), 
the laws provide a basis of focus and commitment.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., 79. Galula believes mobile reserves must be in place at every territorial command, and constantly interact 
with the resident population. When not engaged in direct support of military units, they should work on civic-action 
endeavors. 
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sanctioned area where trespassers can be arrested or shot on sight.24 As security 
increases, the static reserve forces should spread out to a point where “only a few men 
will be left to provide the core for self-defense units.”25 Heavy installations should be 
prohibited; only construction of installations for what is “strictly necessary” should be 
allowed. In further isolating the population from the insurgency, careful control over the 
population should be established by conducting a thorough census, establishing curfews, 
imposing a strict pass system, and maintaining staunch border security.26 Lastly, political 
resolve was very important to Galula, as he viewed politics as central to meet a successful 
end-state. He noted that supporting local elections and leaders to build on other 
operational and tactical gains was an imperative.  
2. Roger Trinquier, Defining Modern Warfare27  
Roger Trinquier, like Galula, experienced some foundational events during World 
War II, and later in French Indochina (Vietnam), and Algeria. His overarching position 
was more Draconian than Galula’s, having once stated that the insurgent enemy should 
be fought with the mindset of “fighting fire with fire… Acting differently would have 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 79. Galula warns that this is a last resort measure and should be done with careful planning and 
coordination from psychological to logistical preparation, so  as to not antagonize the population and to offer economic 
and social incentives. Initially, resettlement should be conducted on a small scale in order to test the conditions 
associated with its execution. Also, see Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare 1945–62” in Counterinsurgency in 
Modern Warfare, eds. Malkasian and Marston (Osprey: Oxford. 2008), 107–107. As will be discussed throughout this 
chapter, resettlement and regrouping are fundamental strategies found in the “gold standard” theory and practice. For 
instance, the French took a page from Lacheroy and the 19th century principles that preceded him in 1955 Algeria 
where “free fire zones”—or “forbidden zones”—were created in order to help deteriorate the logistical support of the 
National Liberation Front (FLN), and provide the population access to basic needs in a secure environment (schools, 
clinics, etc.).  
25 Ibid.  
26 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria 1956–1958 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1963), 100. And David 
Galula, Contre-insurrection (New York: Praeger, 1964). The movement of the population in many areas in Algeria was 
strictly controlled through pass systems. As Galula described: “Nobody could leave the village for more than 24 hours 
without a pass; nobody could receive a stranger to the village without permission. The rules were announced to the 
population at a meeting… Passes and permissions were not refused unless we had some definite reason… The system 
inhibited the FLN agents in the village, and gave the inhabitants a valid alibi for refusing work as messengers or 
suppliers to the guerillas,” 174–175. 
27 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, (New York: Praeger, 2006), 6. 
Trinquier defined “Modern Warfare” as an “interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, and 
military—which aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.” 
His book sought to describe how each element serves as a means to deal with such challenges.  
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been absurd.”28 At the same time, however, he contended that during the early stages, the 
counterinsurgent must present a counter-cause to the insurgency. This can be executed 
through a set of reforms that are ideally mirrored off the population’s needs.29 
In terms of employing force, Trinquier had his own perspective on what Galula 
called “static forces.” He posited that other methods—such as stagnant military outposts, 
autonomous commando groups, isolated ambushes, and wide-range sweeps—rarely 
obtained the goals for which they were intended. He often used the term “static mission,” 
to emphasize the protracted nature of such operations. Even so, all zones under the 
counterinsurgents’ control should make conditions untenable for the insurgent to 
operate.30 Finding the appropriate balance was as much as an art as a science.  
Stagnant outposts were of particular concern to Trinquier, believing they come “at 
great expense in areas to be pacified, [and] are in general not successful. Outposts serve 
as beacons to what COIN operatives are doing, and do not prevent the guerilla from 
subjecting the inhabitants to their will.”31 The only tangible benefits, states Trinquier, are 
that “they enable the forces to maintain open roads and protect supply convoys.”32 His 
observations are reflective of the French experience in Indochina in the late 1940s, where 
isolated French garrisons were especially vulnerable to attacks by guerrilla forces.33   
A high degree of control over the population was a very important issue for 
Trinquier. As a part of a regimented and effective administration network, he noted that 
bureaus should be established in order to oversee such efforts. Such organizations could 
                                                 
28 LTN (ret.) Bertrand, Valeyre et Alexandre Guerin, “From Galula to Petraeus: The French legacy in U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Cahier de la recherché Doctrinale, 22.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 54.  
31 Ibid., 47. These reportedly were common feelings amongst commanders on the ground in Algeria. As 
expressed by famed French General Charles Nogues: “With your forces spread out as they are, you have lost all 
military value. Your posts are utterly useless, their strength is too small to allow any serious sortie against the 
guerillas.” Also see David Galula, Pacification in Algeria 1956–1958, 21.   
32 Ibid. 
33 Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare 1945–62.” In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. Eds. 
Malkasian and Marston (Osprey: Oxford, 2008), 97. One of the more horrific examples was the treacherous withdrawal 
from a frontier garrison in Cao Bang that led to the demise of more than 4,800 French troops as a result of calculated 
ambushes and offensives by the Viet Minh. Once the French effort was reinvigorated with U.S. aid, General Jean de 
Lattre de Tassigny mounted a counteroffensive in 1951, where he established the “‘de Lattre line’—“a ring of 
blockhouses and fortified positions to steel the delta against future offensives” from by Viet Minh.  
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and should impose very strict control over food supplies, grazing of livestock, border 
security, as well as “all resources our adversaries can use” depending on the 
circumstance.34 Additional emphasis on “systematic lockout of urban areas, the 
relocation of isolated rural comminutes, use of extra-legal police measures” and 
associated techniques were necessary.35   
At the same time, Trinquier believed that the best way to provide security and 
stability in a populated area was to arm the population (e.g., home guard or militia). He 
stated that “no one shall be able to avoid this service, and each person at any moment will 
be subject to the orders of his civil or military superiors to participate in protective 
measures.”36 In essence, Trinquier viewed controlling zones in such a manner that 
essentially reestablished “the old system of medieval, fortified villages designed to 
protect the inhabitants from marauding bands.”37  
Intelligence collection—by nearly any means necessary—was encouraged by 
Trinquier. These efforts were to be organized with established interrogation services. 38  
He made good use of such an intelligence apparatus, which focused on the strengths, 
weaknesses and strategy of the insurgency; this became very effective under a revitalized 
Special Branch.39 At the same time, Trinquier was also aware of the intelligence 
limitations, stating that the counterinsurgent is significantly disadvantaged, whereas the 
indigenous insurgent harnesses propaganda in a way that the counterinsurgent cannot (by 
default, affecting the ability to collect intelligence): the “counterinsurgent is tied to his 
                                                 
34 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 30. 
35 Octavian Manea, “Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion: An Interview with Etienne de 
Durand.” Small Wars Journal, March 3, 2011.  
36 Ibid., 28. This could be a volatile option if certain benchmarks have not been met in adequately flushing-out the 
embedded insurgent infrastructure. 
37 Ibid., 62. 
38 Ibid., 28. Designated persons would be tasked to build organizations with minimum help from the authorities. 
An area was to be broken down into districts and sub-districts with assistants monitoring and administrating from the 
lowest levels. Police forces and mobile gendarmerie forces were considered essential for the bottom-up creation of the 
intelligence organization. 
39 Richard Strubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 
1948–60. In Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. Eds. Carter Malkasian and Daniel Marston (Osprey: Oxford. 
2008), 124. 
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responsibilities and to his past,” while the insurgent is contrarily “not obliged to prove 
[anything]; he is judged by what he promises, not what he does.”40 
3. Charles Lacheroy and Doctrine de Guerre Revoultionnaire (DGR) 
Charles Lacheroy was an extremely influential French military officer during the 
Algerian and Indochina Wars. In contrast with the previous two authors who wrote from 
their experiences in retrospect, Lacheroy was vocal in “French policy… leading 
conferences and lectures, contributing to doctrinal manuals, and advising day-to-day 
operations” having influence over the ongoing debates throughout the ‘50s and 60s.41  
Lacheroy was also considered to be “the most totalitarian” of all the authors. It was 
Lacheroy who argued that countering revolutionary warfare is the business of all society. 
He noted, “In Indochina, as in China, as in Korea, as elsewhere, we note that the 
strongest seems defeated by the weakest.”42 
Lacheroy believed that there is an impetus to control both “bodies” and “souls.” 
As discussed in the DGR that he lobbied, “The French DGR School is fully aware that 
the control of “bodies” is a necessary precondition to that of the souls: rallying the 
population behind a given ideal is pointless if it is not tightly controlled.”43 A broad and 
extensive IO campaign is, therefore, necessary in order to address the morale and 
ideological endeavor that would reorient the population away from the insurgency. 
Lacheroy believed that IO of this magnitude should be as potent as the communists’ 
approach. As control is established in this manner, so is the military response.44  
In terms of employing force, the DGR was specific as to underline “the 
uselessness of operations when the right conditions are not meant. These conditions 
varied, but were primarily focused on the need to have credible, actionable intelligence; 
force ratios that matched roughly 6 to 1; the ability to hold zones that have been cleared; 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Octavian Manea, “Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion: An Interview with Etienne de 
Durand,” Small Wars Journal, March 3, 2011. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
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and “a permanent presence of territorial forces,” ideally drawn from the locals.45 Not 
having these conditions in place would “reveal the fecklessness of the counter-insurgent 
[sic],” and place the population at risk.46  
4. Practice versus Theory: Algeria  
Though Algeria proved to be unsuccessful for the French, both Galula and 
Trinquier used their experiences in Algeria as a primary motivation behind their writings. 
The conflict had a significant impact upon their reflection on the subject of COIN, and 
how the U.S. would later view its own doctrine. Lacheroy and the DGR, on the other 
hand, continued to be studied broadly in France; even while Galula remained a relatively 
unknown player.  
Looking at the case itself, there is much consistency in terms of the perceived 
need to control the population and isolate the insurgent from the population. Trinquier’s 
and Lacheroy’s assessments seem to be more in line with the realities that developed on-
the-ground, where “there was more concern with control as opposed to consent.”47 
Galula’s writings, on the other hand, are in line with what Thomas Rid described as one 
“that connects the nineteenth century to the twenty-first.48 In reality, Galula describes a 
system that, in application, was more consistent with the early approach known as “oil-
spot,” a concept originally spearheaded by Gallieni and Lyautey in the late 19th 
                                                 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Thomas Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine.” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 33, no. 5 (October 2010): abstract.  
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century.49 This method was somewhere “between the British-American “hearts and 
minds” and French DGR school” that included a certain level of political resolve.50 
The modified “oil spot” method was aptly applied in many areas of Algeria by the 
mid-1950s; however, this in itself was a problem. A specific example was the French 
tactics in Djebel Aissa Mimoun, where Galula once served as a company commander. At 
that time, the population was not supportive of the French presence and sympathizers. As 
a consequence, the people faced wonton ambush and resettlement for lack of support and 
out-lashes towards ALN forces.51 Similar methods had been employed to neutralize more 
than half of the ALN forces in other areas earlier and throughout the conflict, while also 
                                                 
49See Lyautey, Du Role colonial de l’Armee. Ibid 239. Also see “Winning Hearts and Minds: Historical Origins 
of the Concept and Its Current Implementation in Afghanistan.” Cahier de la recherché Doctrinale, 42. Gallieni 
described the guidelines to oil spot to his troops during the Madagascar campaign between 1897–1902: “Pacify and 
extensively occupy the territory according to the “oil spot” principle; always advance outwards; combine political and 
military actions in order to take control of the country; immediately established close contacts with the population, get 
familiar with their habits and their mindset, and meet their basic requirements in order to persuade them to accept new 
institutions.” See Alex Marshall, “Imperial Nostalgia, the Liberal Lie, and the Perils of Postmodern Counterinsurgency. 
Small Wars and Insurgencies. 21: 2. He argues that the oil, or ink, spot strategy that Lyautey implemented did not 
blend well with the “ongoing cultural differences, and draconian French legal codes,” which acted as disincentives to 
the trading posts. Plus, the French needed to still deliver “measureable military effect.”  239. Regardless, Thomas Rid 
notes that Galula’s writings were “hardly innovative.” He notes that “French officers to this day are more likely to read 
Marshals Gallieni or Lyautey, whose operations succeeded, not an obscure company commander whose war was bitter 
defeat.” Thomas Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine.” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 33, no. 5 (October 2010): abstract. 
50 Octavian Manea, Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion: An Interview with Etienne de 
Durand,” Small Wars Journal, March 3, 2011. 
51 Gregor Mathias, Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory, (Oxford: Praeger, 2011), 15. 
After enacting the resettlement, Oudiai, the local recruited leader, quickly “named an FLN chief in each village and 
hamlet, who in turn selected two lieutenants. Cells of the OPA identified suspects: people hostile to the movement, 
skeptics who lacked confidence in the future victory, people who refused to pay the FLN’s taxes.”   
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demoralizing their ranks and pitting their leadership against each other.52 Such tactics, 
however, were counterproductive in the long-run.  
In many cases, resistance was met with a heavy hand where frivolous use of 
artillery, napalm, and aggressive resettlement procedures, resembling 19th century 
“scorched earth” polices, were implemented.53 The French would openly fire upon 
livestock and enact other measures affecting the entire population, not just the insurgents. 
These coercive polices were applied irrespective of who was innocent and guilty. Indeed, 
the majority of those affected were innocent bystanders. These tactics were perceived as 
wholly unfair to those who were “only guilty of living in a certain place or looking a 
certain way.”54  By 1957, “torture and the disappearances of dissidents and detainees in 
military custody” also had a significant impact that “kick-started a heretofore sluggish 
antiwar movement.”55 As a result, the tide began to turn against the French politically, 
where erosion for the effort domestically affected the strategic aptitude of those on the 
ground.  
Methods to gain the support of the population, like the 13-point plan outlined at 
that time first included the Dejbel Aissa Mimoun were for naught and ineffective mostly 
because of the strict coercion applied.56 Galula postulated: 
                                                 
52 Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare 1945–62,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, eds. Malkasian 
and Marston (Osprey: Oxford, 2008). In Algeria, the Setif Rebellion in 1945 sent 20,000 Muslims to their demise in a 
campaign of French reprisals (known as the Setif and Guelma Massacre).As Porch explains, “the arbitrary brutality of 
French repression combined with the dislocations caused by French counterinsurgency tactics to transform a trickle of 
FLN sympathizers and recruits into a torrent.” Ill will as a result of the operations created an atmosphere for the 
insurgency to not only survive, but solidify under a singular cause, galvanizing their narrative and stature. As Porch 
explains, “French retribution proved swift and brutal… Depending on the source, between 2,000 and 12,000 Muslims 
were slaughtered.” As a result of these actions, Zighout Youcef, a mastermind militant, “succeeded beyond his wildest 
dreams in enlarging the gulf between Muslims and non-Muslims in Algeria.” The 1955 swarms against the French 
offers another example where tit-for-tat operations would persist until  the onset of the Challe Offensive in 1959. Once 
again, swift and brutal retribution by the French—what would become known as the “Philipeeville massacres” ensued 
but with little lasting effect. The French finally called a state of emergency—changing the dynamic on the ground from 
a civilian led strategy of appeasement to a centralized military effort with increased troops numbers increased as a 
result. In a last ditch effort in 1959, Challe initiated a “formidable offensive… able to synchronize aggressive ground 
and air attacks,” 103–109.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Gregor Mathias, Galula in Algeria, 15–19. The original formula—that the 13-point plan derived—was known 
as il faut mouiller la population, or “let’s soften them up.”  
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The theory that the population would join our side once it felt protected 
from the threat of rebel bands had proved wrong. The idea that we could 
forcibly implicate the population on our side had not worked. It was clear 
to me that the major stumbling block was the OPA [Organisation Politico-
Adminsitrative]. We would make no progress as long as we had not 
purged the villages of the insurgent political cell.57  
As was the case with the 19th century French concepts of “quadrilliage” and “racial 
mapping,” as a part of the “oil spot” effort, Trinquier harped on these methods focusing 
not on dividing the insurgent movement, but on applying systematic population control.58 
Again, these were often more in line with coercive actions that were associated with 
preventative detention or torture. More benign persuasive measures, like those found in 
the 13-point plan, likely failed because of the indiscriminate violence that preceded or 
accompanied them. In other words, the sticks significantly outweighed the carrots.    
As Galula warned, populations should not be asked to cooperate en masse.59 
Instead, the message should have been for the population to stay neutral, and if they 
decide to harbor and assist the insurgency, “more military operations [will commence] 
and thus inflict more destruction.”60 This, along with properly surmising the resource 
requirements for a comprehensive “oil spot” strategy, could have been beneficial.  
Lastly, and as both Trinquier and Galula noted in their own writings, the ability of 
the COIN forces to secure the sovereign borders of the conflicted state or governed area 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 15–20. Mathias later commented that “instead of dismantling the OPA [in the first place], they tried to 
rally the people first allowing the FLN to infiltrate the GAD [groupe d’autodefense] militias causing the failure of the 
joint operation.” The 13-point plan specifically covered the following: “(1) hiring men for public works directly 
benefiting their village; (2) hiring men for public works in the interests of the administration and the army; (3) hiring to 
work on strictly defensive installations (defense walls and watch towers); (4) paid requisition of muleteers for a night 
exercise, (5) requisitions of muleteers to convoy supplies; (6) unpaid requisition of muleteers to patrol across the 
villages; mules carried radio sets and batteries; (7) requisition of muleteers for a night exercise; (8) Kabyle keeping 
watch with soldiers in the post protecting the village; (9) Kabyle guides for night patrols; (10 Kabyle participation in 
armed night patrols; (11) weapons withdrawn after each sortie; (12 weapons left with Kabyles at night under a guard’s 
supervision; and (13) official distribution of weapons to the populace.”   
58 “Winning Hearts and Minds: Historical Origins of the Concept and Its Current Implementation in 
Afghanistan,” Cahier de la recherché Doctrinale, 43. Quadrillage, also known as “gridding tactics,” would be 
facilitated through “prolonged interaction between the population and the armed forces so long as offensive and 
defensive actions are properly supported by political, civil and military authorities.”  
59 Porch, Douglas. “French Imperial Warfare 1945–62,” 91. 
60 Ibid., 94. This was a problem for the French in Algeria; in practice, they not only failed to properly balance 
“carrots and sticks,” but “offer an ideology to counter successfully that of indigenous nationalism” as well. 
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is essential to denying outside sanctuary and support.61 This was perhaps the most 
successful component of French efforts in Algeria. Though the French took advantage of 
their upper-hand against the FLN in the mid-50s by controlling air and sea routes, they 
initially were ineffective in securing the borders between Morocco and Tunisia. By 1958, 
the French resolved the problem by creating the Morice Line—sealing-off both the 
Tunisian and Moroccan borders to the insurgents, severely inhibiting the free-flow of 
supply and sanctuary.62 This key lesson should have been applied to secure the borders 
around Indochina, where “Giap was able to muster significant Chinese support to acquire 
artillery and antiaircraft guns” in his successful offensive at Dien Bien Phu.63 
5. Sir Robert Thompson and Defeating Communist Insurgency 
Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson was a British COIN scholar and practitioner. 
He worked closely with Sir Gerald Templar during the Malaya Emergency, and later 
appointed to the British Advisory Mission in Saigon (BRIAM in 1961). His writings 
reflect a nuanced interpretation of minimum force; a concept the British military were 
constantly evolving. He surmised that in order to operationalize efforts to undermine the 
insurgency and its infrastructure, the counterinsurgent must ‘win-over’ the population. In 
doing so, the COIN force must “clear, hold, and win...” an area.64 Thompson outlined 
four specific areas of concentration for the COIN effort:  
                                                 
61 Galula, Counterinsurgency Theory, 23–24.  
62 Austin Long, “On ‘Other War:’ Lessons from Five Decades of RAND COIN Research.” National Defense 
Research Institute, 2006. Also see Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare 1945–62,” in Counterinsurgency in 
Modern Warfare, eds. Malkasian and Marston (Osprey: Oxford. 2008), 106. The Morice Line “ran from the Sahara to 
the sea along the common frontier between Algeria and Tunisia was the more sophisticated of the French barriers, 
combining electrified fences, fields of anti-personnel and “jump” mines, radar-guided artillery, and constant air 
surveillance.” As a result, the inhabitants that resided by the borders were “regrouped,” by the French; dividend of 
these actions shifted the momentum. The failed attempt at breeching this line during the “Battle of the Frontiers” 
reveals the effectiveness of the Morice Line. As described by Porch, the “Battle of Frontiers” in 1958 left 22 every 
hundred capable to break through, “a staggering 78 percent casualty rate of killed, wounded, captured, and missing” 
resulted. Much of these were eventually intercepted by the mobile forces behind the lines.  
63 Ibid., 99 
64 The offensive tempo that Thompson would describe as the “clear” phase where operational defeat of the 
insurgent is critical. Colonel Fertig, during 1962 COIN symposium sponsored by RAND, substantiated the argument 
conveying  that as long as the insurgency is able to disrupt measures toward political reform, and hinder the 
intelligence-gathering apparatus, the population will never feel secure regardless of promises and development policies; 
offensive measures must be taken to cripple that initiative.  
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• To have a clear political aim. 
• To function within the law. 
• To establish an overall plan in which all political, socio-economic 
and military responses are coordinated. 
• To give the priority to the defeat of political subversion, and to 
secure its own base areas before conducting a military campaign.65  
Thompson notes that the approach requires various levels of implementation to be 
effective, to include: a constant offense against active insurgents; imposition of control 
measures that include the concepts of strategic hamlets and arming local militia, a COIN 
force able to compel the insurgents to shift to the defensive, and to lose the initiative with 
the population.66  
At the same time, Thompson warned against measures that were excessive. He 
was equally concerned with command and control and use of poorly trained forces—both 
British and indigenous. Though recognizing the value of small units, for example, he 
warned that autonomous, Special Forces-type units “can easily get out of control.”67 
Perhaps above all other areas, Thompson was most confident and interested in the 
value of isolating the population from the insurgency. Instead of arbitrary or planned 
brute force to coerce (as the French displayed in Algeria), methods that increasingly ran 
counter to the British minimum force concept, Thompson preferred the physical 
separation of insurgents from the local population vis-à-vis resettlement and regrouping 
of select segments of the population. Specifically, this was found in his concept of 
strategic hamlets. 
There are three objectives to the strategic hamlet as described by Thompson. First, 
the centerpiece to the program is to protect the population; however, the most vital aspect 
is the “elimination within the hamlet of the insurgent underground organization,” as well 
as the infrastructure that sustains it.68  Second, is to unite the people and engage them in 
                                                 
65 Ian F.W. Beckett, “Robert Thompson and the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, 1961–1965.” Small 
Wars and Insurgencies 8, no.3 (Winter 1997), 44. 
66 Ibid., 112–116.  
67 Ibid. Examples include Kitson’s pseudo-gangs, Orde Wingate’s special night squads, Britain’s “black and 
tans,” and the Kenya Police Reserve (to name a few). 
68 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 124. 
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the government, thus encouraging a sense of national solidarity. Lastly, is the 
development of social, economic, and political fields of influence that create an entwined 
microcosm of community and solidarity amongst the inhabitants within a particular 
hamlet.69 This latter stage is where the actual physical regrouping and relocation of the 
population is necessary, but should be based on conditions and executed with extreme 
discretion.70   
Thompson makes sure to note that strategic hamlets are not to be concentration 
camps. Instead, persons should be involved in fixing roads and other infrastructure that 
have been damaged, while strict control should be maintained over the movement of 
peoples and supplies. Templar saw these areas as an opportunity to introduce “social 
measures and development projects that were always coupled with a coercive 
dimension.”71 Though resettled areas may be barren at first, after years of development 
(the theory goes), opportunities would expand, and the access to amenities is possible in 
comparison to the previously remote location.72   
Thompson notes that there are still broader intelligence, political and information 
operation priorities that should focus on the contact points between the insurgent 
organization, working the villages, towns, and the population writ large. The government 
must have a clear political aim, and function within the confines of the law. Moreover, 
the government must also give priority to defeat political subversion, not just the 
guerillas. This is mostly a principle to be executed during the build-up phase of the 
insurgency. During “hot” insurgency, the government must secure the base areas first  
 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 122. 
71 “Winning Hearts and Minds: Historical Origins of the Concept and Its Current Implementation in 
Afghanistan,” Cahier de la recherché doctrinale, 26. 
72 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 126–127. Planning is essential when resettling segments of the 
population into strategic hamlets: the amount of people to be moved (this should always be as few as possible based on 
location; the area should be one that can be well defended, as well as have secondary value of protecting railways or 
other critical infrastructure as possible; and access to natural resources and transportation hubs is critical. Any area that 
falls outside this scope—especially far, remote locations—should be avoided and not considered as an ample location 
for the hamlet. See pg 138 where hamlets were erected too fast and dispersed too far.  
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(as discussed previously) and work outward to generate support from the population.73 
Lastly, Thompson adds that at the operational level, psychological warfare should be 
carried out by military means, but should be considered to be an “internal political 
matter… a civilian responsibility, particularly with respect to planning and execution.” 
The tactics themselves should resonate with the populace and in balance with 
conditions.74  
6. The Malaya Emergency: Templar’s HAM in Practice  
While Thompson sought to capture the lessons he learned from fighting 
communist insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam, Sir Gerald Templer was a critical factor 
in shifting the strategy to one that was conducive—though not identical—to the 
principles outlined by Thompson. Prior to his taking command, measures were far 
removed from what Thompson would have considered best practices.  
During the early phases in the Malayan Emergency, sweeps and heavy-handed 
action was the natural response for the officers; they had “trouble understanding the 
operational environment they now had to cope with… [while] troops were clearly 
unprepared for jungle warfare.”75 For instance, Sir Henry Gurney didn’t see a problem 
with such coercive approaches, believing that “the Chinese are notoriously inclined to 
lean towards whichever side frightens them more at the moment.”76 This policy, 
however, served against the best interests of the British, leading toward the near-total 
 
 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 55–57.  
74 Ibid.  
75 “Winning Hearts and Minds: Historical Origins of the Concept and Its Current Implementation in 
Afghanistan.” Cahier de la recherché Doctrinale. Pg 13. Also see translation of Leguay, Anthony. Etat d’Urgence en 
Malaisie—Un exemple d’Adaptation a la Contre-Insurrection par les Forces Britanniques (1948–1960). Cahier de la 
recherché doctrinale du CDEF, 2010.  
76 Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 
1948–60,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Malkasian and Marston eds (Osprey: Oxford, 2008), 115. The 
original focus was on eradicating the insurgents as fast as possible, to include those who supported them. Like Challe, 
General C.H. Boucher used “sweeps” to extinguish of the most active insurgents. In his case, the success rate was 
extremely low, where as Trinquier warned, the enemy would often “melt quickly into the jungle, or catch the troops in 
ambush.” 
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alienation of the Chinese. As Stubbs explains, “The army appeared more at war with the 
Malaysian population, especially the Chinese community, than acting as its guardian and 
protector.”77  
Under Briggs’ and Lyttelton’s commands, such widespread collective punishment 
was reinforced as status quo. For instance, tough laws were emplaced in Malaya to “seize 
and deport all Chinese in a bad area,” as well as impose a “collective fine in an area that 
was uncooperative.”78 In two separate cases as early as 1948, “entire villages were 
burned to the ground, and in many other instances, houses were destroyed.”79 By late 
1949, Bennett noted that:  
Mass arrests, property destruction, and forced population movement, 
combined with loose controls on lethal force, created a coercive effect. 
The consequences of these policies were mounting civilian casualties, 
which the government allowed to continue because its intelligence 
assessments suggested they were militarily effective.80  
Templer would later introduce his HAM model in 1952 as what has been believed 
by many contemporaries to be a more effective means to enact government policy, while 
maintaining the welfare of the general public. Templar moved to change strategy from 
the Briggs and Lyttelton models in Malaya to introducing a policy that made the police 
servants of the people. As a result, the enforcement of law premised on the protection of 
members of the community, instead of imposing collective punishments, came to 
fruition.81 Though many of the laws were still harsh, they were more likely to be viewed 
as fair and non-discriminatory by the population as they applied to everyone. They 
included “imposing strict curfews, a mandatory death penalty for carrying arms, and life 
imprisonment for providing supplies, or other support for terrorists.”82  
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 116. 
80 Huw Bennett, “A ‘Very Salutary Effect’: The Counter-Terror Strategy in the Early Malaysian Emergency, June 
1948 to December 1949.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (June 2009): 415–444. 
81 This became known as Operation Service.   
82 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 53. 
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As Templar increased his intelligence capabilities with this effort, his approach 
advanced from sweeps (again, used frequently early in the conflict) to jungle warfare that 
focused on cutting the insurgents off from the population and supply. Despite these 
changes in approach, the strategy of the British was still clear in that the “central, 
omnipresent task… was to going to the jungle, to the enemy, and kill him by surprise as 
often and as quickly as possible.”83 This “jungle bashing,” as well as the raids carried-out 
by Special Air Service (SAS) providing the infantry with “strategic depth,” were a critical 
metric for success in deriving the total number of kills for a unit.84 The British Conduct 
of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaysia (ATOM) outlined in detail how such tactics 
should be prosecuted through regular practice of saturation patrolling, artillery, and air 
bombardments.85  
The hamlet program in Malaya insisted that there could be no movement in or out 
of the respective hamlet at night, and members of the population would not be allowed to 
leave with any food or supply at any time; food denial and control, conducted through 
surprise or otherwise were essential in keeping pressure on the Min Yuen.86 Often, these 
mechanisms would generate strife within the insurgency, as well as increased 
helplessness that would lead to surrender. As described by McMichael:  
 
                                                 
83 Scott R McMichael, “A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry,” Combat Studies Institute, Research Survey, 
no. 6. 1987, 101–110. 
84 Ibid. Ambushes were still a critical element to these actions; when good intelligence was provided, a “high 
proportion” of the ambushes were occurred on the “jungle fringe where the terrorists met with their food and 
information sources.”  Also see “Winning Hearts and Minds: Historical Origins of the Concept and Its Current 
Implementation in Afghanistan,” Cahier de la recherché Doctrinale, 25.  
85 Ibid. Using this approach, units quietly deployed several patrols from squad to platoon strength into an area 
where the guerrillas were known or thought to be. Each platoon established a temporary base (24–48 hours) from 
which it pushed out smaller patrols in a systematic fashion to cover thoroughly and carefully a designated area. Once 
one area had been checked out, the platoon moved on to a new area, and the process was repeated… This saturation 
patrolling frequently produced contacts. Artillery was used to “fire on suspected enemy camps or previously abandoned 
camps to discourage their reuse and to force the terrorists to leave them if they were occupied.” Pg 99. Bombers were 
also used to harass the enemy, like during Operation Termite in 1954. Both had drawbacks, but were used nonetheless.  
86 McMichael, “A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry,” 118. As explained by McMichael, “Thus, when the 
civilians in an affected district awoke in the morning, they found every gate in the village fence guarded by police and 
soldiers.” Also see Stubbs, Richard. “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy 
in Malaya 1948–60, in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, eds. Malkasian and Marston (Osprey: Oxford, 2008), 
123. As Stubbs explains, central cooking areas were established and no uncooked food could ever leave the vicinity. By 
making all food perishable in that environment, food could not hold more than a few hours at a time. 
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The British routinely practiced basic food control measures such as 
licensing sellers and restaurateurs, restricting personal food stocks, and 
requiring buyers to show ration cards. However, when the decision was 
taken to mount a major anti-guerrilla operation, the British mounted a 
much more comprehensive food denial program. Food denial took many 
forms, but its aim was always to squeeze completely dry the daily trickle 
of supplies to the Communist terrorists in a particular area.87 
A major element to the effectiveness of Templer’s plan resided in utilizing various 
resources and political attributes. At the height of the Malaya operations, “the Malayan 
government employed 40,000 soldiers, 45,000 police, and 1.5 million “Home Guard” 
were established to root out the insurgents and protect the population.”88 Such emphasis 
on local forces not only makes sense economically for the COIN force, but is also the 
only serious way security had a chance to be maintained. 
Moreover, many of the post-Briggs resettlement programs still had significant 
coercive overtones (vis-à-vis “jungle bashing” and food controls). Harper argued that 
Templar used such methods and simply “Cleaned-up a conflict that had already been won 
by using repressive methods, notable the deportation of an estimated 16,000 
“communists” to Nationalist China, where most were surely executed.”89 Other experts 
like Karl Hack, Gian Gentile, and Paul Dixon have also argued that it was actually the 
sheer, brute force, coupled with the stated deportations that actually broke the insurgency 
in Malaya, not solely the relative benevolence of Templar’s HAM attempts with the 
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population.90 In other words, the standards and nature of HAM, even under Templar 
himself, reveal that there was always an essence of iron beneath the velvet glove.91 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY: THE “BEST PRACTICES” OF THE 20TH 
 CENTURY “GOLD STANDARD” 
The overarching principle in 20th century COIN appears to be that the population 
must be secured; how force is employed, and control imposed, is critical to that endeavor. 
Though the British and French had significantly different circumstances in their 
respective conflicts in terms of strategy and overall geopolitics, there are various 
practices that are consistent, and thus, encapsulate the “gold standard.”92  
• The staging of military outposts near to the population was  central. The writings 
and examined cases support the notion that COIN forces should be in proximity to 
the population—whether locating grid or “static forces,” as Galula described 
them, to the location of the population, relocating the population to particular 
                                                 
90 See Karl Hack. “The Malaysian Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm.” Journal of Strategic Studies 3, 
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backfire by increasing instability.” See Andrew Birtle, “Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” 
Military Review 88, no. 4 (2008): 45–53. 
92 Though there are standardized issues involving all COIN—and warfare in general –geographic and cultural 
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the population. Location, size, configuration, international borders, climate, population, and economy are all elements 
that are critical to the geographic and cultural environment. See Douglas Porch, “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious 
Promise of COIN,” Naval Postgraduate School, 1. The terrain of these areas often played a major role as well. The 
treacherousness of the geography, and local disease and ailments, would cause more casualties for the Western power 
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sectors where forces are stationed (e.g., strategic hamlets), or a combination 
thereof. Both coercion through brute force and persuasion were key to success.  
• Though sweeps were often found to be counterproductive to the overall mission, 
they were considered necessary to gain the initiative and fracture the momentum 
of the insurgency; creating space for other measures. This was consistent in both 
Algeria and Malaya. Moreover, clearing operations and other offensive 
operations were noted as necessary throughout the “gold standard” writings and 
cases in order to maintain pressure on subversive activity and erode the insurgent 
infrastructure and support. The difference resided in planning, value placed on 
intelligence driving the operation, and information operation (IO), or in that era, 
the propaganda campaign. Outcomes varied based on how effective these 
elements were applied.   
• Commando groups, like the SAS in Malaya, have been recognized as another 
important, but highly controversial, force in COIN. Though prevalent throughout 
the history of war, use of commandos (e.g. Special Forces) was considered to 
have just as much strategic risk as strategic advantage. Though commando groups 
varied in their approach and impact, the common lesson appears to be that the 
manner in which such forces react to situations and implement control measures 
has been a core component in how control itself can be gained or lost.  
• From one degree or another, the literature maintains that strict control measures 
must be imposed on a large segment of the population in order to isolate the 
insurgent, and are a critical element as respective COIN forces, local and foreign, 
takes root in country. During the implementation of these tactics, the respective 
authority must show that they are not only prepared, but determined, to be 
ruthless. Enforcing measures were meant to impact all inhabitants, directly or 
indirectly.93 Of the examples studied, however, some approaches such as 
collective punishment, were on the whole counterproductive in the mid to long-
term, whereas others, such as discriminate use of force and well-planned and 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 144. For instance, if households were outside the perimeter of a hamlet, they should be persuaded, and if 
necessary compelled, to move within the designated borders. 
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coordinated strategic hamlet programs were generally constructive to the overall 
mission. 94 For example, the “forbidden zones” described by Galula, and put in 
place in Malaya were generally viewed as palatable since all parties were to be 
held accountable on an equal basis—no one group was targeted, marginalized, or 
punished as a whole for others’ actions. However, even with these more judicious 
policies, there were still violent excesses in the use of brute force “for purely 
arbitrary means,” such as preventative detention, summary execution, and 
torture.95 This need not underappreciate that brute force in the short-term 
(discriminate or not) appeared to have created space for more benign coercive 
measures to be applied later, as was seen in Malaya and elsewhere.96 
• The employment of disciplined police forces was the most common preference in 
the literature for how to best wield force in an area of dissension. Such forces 
could be comprised of indigenous, foreign, or a combination of troops. Trinquier 
preferred arming the local population as a sound method to augment security. 
Home guard and constabulary units of this sort could be found in both Algeria and 
Malaya with minor nuances.97  
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• Intelligence collection was stressed as another important factor, in fact, a 
prerequisite of population control and necessary for effective kinetic operations 
writ large. One study specifically found that the tactical success and flow of 
information on the battlefield in Malaya “were inextricably linked.”98 As 
explained by McMichael, “the more guerillas that [sic who] were killed by 
infantry, the more information came in [from the local population]. This increase 
in information subsequently led to more kills, and so on.”99  
• Cooperation from the population (vis-à-vis intelligence) was conditional, 
however, on the confidence of the population that the security apparatus could 
protect them. If confidence faltered—in other words performance—legitimacy 
lessened. As a consequence, the inclination to provide adequate and timely 
intelligence waned.  
• An information operation, or what the authors describe as propaganda, was to be 
conducted during every phase mentioned above and directed toward all parties 
involved: COIN forces, the population, and the insurgents.100  
 
Thus, while indiscriminate violence through brute force is considered 
counterproductive to achieving COIN objectives, high levels of coercion were believed 
necessary for tactical purposes. In practice, uses of both discriminate and judicious 
indiscriminate violence proved effective. Historically, COIN was more violent in the 
“gold standard” despite many of the contemporary perceptions. The “gold standard” as 
written by past theorists contained more use of violence than today’s HAM, or 
population-centric, doctrine which was allegedly derived from these theorists’ writings. It 
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appears that history and the writings of key COIN theorists are both misrepresented and 
misinterpreted. Recognizing this inconsistency is non-trivial.  
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III. U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE 
This chapter captures FM 3-24’s principles which are intended to be the enablers 
to implementing a successful COIN campaign. First, summary reviews of the operational 
approaches as outlined in FM 3-24 are provided. The remaining chapter sections discuss 
three main themes: employment of force, control over the population, and intelligence 
and information operations (propaganda as described in the previous chapter), which are 
all pertinent factors for understanding the level of coercion and control recommended in 
the current 2006 doctrine.  
A. FM 3-24: OPERATIONAL APPROACHES101 
As explained in the doctrine, the following approaches are to guide the entirety of 
COIN efforts. Gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the population is considered to be the 
means toward a long-term political end-state.102 Political objectives must drive military 
operations and all operations must be considered two ways: how they will increase the 
host-nation’s (HN) legitimacy, and how they will achieve U.S. objectives.103 These 
approaches can be “combined,” depending on the environment, availability of resources, 
and political scope of the conflict. Taken individually, there are three examples that are 
described in the doctrine as effective operational approaches to establishing legitimacy: 
clear-hold-build, combined action, and limited support.   
According to a recent Department of the Army memorandum on FM 3-24 
revision, clear-hold-build is “the prevailing operational framework for 
counterinsurgency.”104 FM 3-24 states that this approach should be applied in a “specific, 
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high-value area experiencing overt insurgent operations” by establishing a secure 
physical and psychological environment, firm government control, and population 
support.105 These require an abundance of resources—money, manpower, and time—for 
this approach to be effective. Such operations must expand from a “secured base” and 
create the following necessary conditions: COIN capabilities superior to the insurgent’s 
availability of non-military resources to carry-out essential improvements in the daily 
lives of the population, insurgents cleared from the area to be “held,” insurgent 
organization infrastructure neutralized; and HN presence established.  
During the ‘clear’ phase, offensive operations commence where the insurgent 
should be isolated, killed or captured, and cut-off from external support. As the doctrine 
specifics, “these combat operations are only the beginning, not the end-state;” in other 
words, the actual removal of those visible insurgent forces does not negate the need to 
stamp-out insurgent infrastructure.106 The latter should be done in a way that “minimizes 
the impact on the local population and is essentially a police action… and legal 
processes.”107  
Sustained pressure on the population should ideally be executed by HN forces, 
and should be conducted during the ‘hold’ phase to begin dismantling the insurgent 
infrastructure.108 Static forces should be in place to deter and prevent a resurgence of 
insurgent presence, and IO should state that “security forces will remain for several years 
and will not leave.”109 All operations should be focused on continuously securing the 
people, establishing a firm presence, recruiting and training local forces in security 
efforts, establishing an equitable political apparatus, and developing a network of 
intelligence agents.110 Certain control measures should also be implemented. During this 
stage, population screening, area surveys to determine resources and population needs, 
                                                 
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid., 683 5–59. 
107 Ibid., 685–87. 
108 Ibid., 708 5–62. 
109 Ibid., 728 5–65. 
110 Ibid., 691–692.  
 33 
environmental improvements via reconstruction, and establishment of an integrated 
communication system with the HN should be conducted.  
Lastly, the “build” phase is meant to wield support for the HN in its efforts to 
rebuild the infrastructure and capabilities in order for the population to establish a 
functional, stable, and economically and socially viable environment. Legitimizing is 
primarily derived from performance, although process is also important. In supporting the 
HN and working toward isolating the insurgency, the central area where the insurgency 
can be out-performed by the U.S.’ development; vis-à-vis nation-building.111 To provide 
adequate protection when resources are available, the HN security forces must 
continually patrol, conduct “needs assessments,” and base those assessments on cultural 
sensitivities, in order to provide essential services and other improvements during this 
phase of operations.  
Combined action is the second key operational approach comprising joint efforts 
where U.S. and HN troops are focused on a single objective. This approach is appropriate 
where there is not a large insurgent presence and where isolating or expelling an 
entrenched insurgent organization is not required. In application, combined action 
“attempts to achieve security and stability in a local area followed by offensive 
operations against insurgent forces [recently] denied access or support.”112 This method 
would be most effective once an insurgent presence has already been weakened through 
effective clearing operations.  
The last of the three central operational approaches presented in the doctrine has 
to do with limited support operations. According to the doctrine, this approach should be 
used in those cases where “U.S. support is limited, focused on peripheral missions like 
advising security forces, providing fire support or other logistical support for a 
sustainment of HN operations.” Presumably, this would entail more Special Forces and 
foreign indigenous defense (FID) missions.   
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B. U.S. COIN PRINCIPLES: THE CRUX OF FM 3-24 
1. Employment of Force 
Securing the population is top priority in U.S. COIN. The doctrine is careful not 
to truncate itself into any specific methodology in terms of executing a particular 
mission; flexibility and adaptability to context is encouraged. Yet, the doctrine does 
outline specific guiding principles (as mentioned above) that act as a template for how a 
campaign should be conducted. 
The doctrine also seeks to stimulate the officer, non-commissioned officer (NCO), 
and soldier, marine, airman and sailor through reading, and ultimately training, with a 
series of “paradoxes” in mind to frame how force should be employed. This is filtered 
down to the lowest tactical levels and intended to help the platoon and company 
commander, NCO, and lower-level military personnel in developing training regimens 
for how to best prosecute COIN. Some of the more applicable paradoxes are as follows: 
• “Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the population, not the 
COIN force.” Isolated garrisons dedicated to force protection are, thus, 
counterproductive, even as survival instinct says otherwise.   
• “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.” For instance, 
offensive operations alone can become powerful political and psychological 
successes for the insurgency, even as they eliminate insurgents.   
• “The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and 
the more risk can be accepted.” Instead of wiping-out the insurgency by force 
when it is weak, the tide turns toward political concessions. 
• “Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.” Again, force, whether 




• “Some of the best weapons don’t shoot.” In other words, COIN operations are 
about more than killing the enemy. A carefully integrated agricultural plan, 
following this logic, could have just as much or more impact in a particular 
area than a sweep operation.113  
Though the doctrine states that “COIN operations combine offensive, defense, 
and stability operations to achieve a stable environment,” for HN legitimacy to develop 
and grow, it is clear that the overarching message from each of these select paradoxes 
equate to two main points:114 first, offensive operations are no longer sufficient; and 
second, defense—defined as restoring public safety—is key in counterinsurgency.115  
Combat operations must always be measured “to address insurgents that [sic who] cannot 
be co-opted into operating inside the rule of law,” while the doctrine confirms that certain 
operations (such as “conducting periodic sweeps”) through overwhelming force may be 
necessary to kill adversaries” perceived as fanatical.116  
At the same time, the killing of noncombatants surpasses mere collateral damage 
as doing so tangibly undermines the counterinsurgent’s goals. Since COIN is “war among 
the people,” combat operations required to eliminate insurgents who cannot be co-opted 
will be necessary. The doctrine consistently balances this by stating “kindness and 
compassion can be as important as killing and capturing.”117  Yet, there is a double 
edged-sword in the sense that the population must be secured to gain legitimacy, securing 
them may mean killing insurgents, these insurgents may be (and will most likely be) 
family members of the population, all while collateral damage is mostly unacceptable. 
Even though there are some very fine lines to be drawn, the crux of minimum force in 
FM 3-24 is based on both “proportionality” and “discriminate use of force.”118 This is in 
 
                                                 
113 Ibid., 48–49. 
114 Ibid., 40 5–3. 
115 Ibid., xvi. 
116 Ibid., 167. 
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fact a redundancy from what is written in the formal laws of war that apply to war in 
general; the doctrine seems to add emphasis to these standards as an imperative in COIN 
more specifically.  
Actual or perceived civilian deaths caused by COIN forces, or as a result of not 
adequately protecting the population from attack, can clearly generate anger among the 
population, a sense of injustice, frustration and active opposition, eventually eroding 
support for the U.S. and HN as legitimate security provider.119 Therefore, the imperative 
is not to kill one’s way to victory. As Kilcullen explains, “violence against noncombatant 
civilians by security forces, whether intentional or accidental, is almost always entirely 
counterproductive.”120 Striking balance between killing the enemy, which “is, and 
always will be, a part of guerilla warfare,” and protecting the noncombatant population 
remains a difficult task.121  
Operationally speaking, the doctrine specifies that “battalion-sized and smaller-
sized units [e.g., platoon] are most effective” in attempting to employ force in a 
discretionary way. Such forces must get as close to the population as possible in order to 
control and protect the people and glean as much intelligence as possible, while 
simultaneously maintaining fluidity of action.122 When feasible, HN forces should take 
the lead, or at least work in conjunction with U.S. forces, whenever possible. Borders 
must also be secured. Some offensive action is still important for overall success, such as 
“disrupting base areas and sanctuaries.”123 
2. Control over the Population 
Controlling the population is critical to isolating insurgents from their cause and 
support. As the doctrine states, “clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be 
necessary… but killing every insurgent is normally impossible,” thus making other 
                                                 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford University Press: New York, 2010), 4.  
122 United States Army, FM 3-24, 5–57, 395–97.  
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tactics necessary.124 Suggestions for how to isolate the insurgents include: redress of 
social, political, and economic grievances; behavioral and mobility control of the 
population; and border security. Population control mechanisms may include conducting 
a census to understand and work with established societal relationships, creating 
identification cards, imposing curfews and pass systems, placing limits on travel and 
visitors, and establishing and properly maintaining checkpoints.125 The benefits to be 
derived from implementing such restrictive measures should be relayed to the population 
through a carefully implemented IO campaign. There must also be space to “provide 
amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government.”126  
Protecting and securing the population is in fact stated as the core consideration. 
The American experience supports this approach from the standpoint that “ultimate 
success…often depends on the interaction of soldiers with indigenous civilian 
populations.”127 Writings on many of America’s early low intensity conflicts illustrate 
just how the U.S. actually dealt with foreign and domestic civilian populations.128  
Oftentimes, violence was employed widely, indiscriminately and with little regard for 
civilians, especially at the beginning of conflicts. More recently, however, greater care 
has been exercised as espoused in the doctrine and guidance provided by top field 
commanders like Generals David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, and John Allen. The 
ongoing question is if these standards have shifted too far away from discriminate 
coercion found in the “gold standard” best practices.  
Lastly, security under the rule of law is considered essential for population control 
to work and be sustained. According to FM 3-24, “to establish legitimacy, commanders 
transition security activities from combat operations as quickly as possible.”129 Moreover, 
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125 Ibid., 180.  
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128 For further reference on the American experience in small wars, see Birtle, Andrew. U.S.-Army 
Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941. Washington D.C.: United States Government 
Printing, November 1997. Birtle, Andrew. U.S.-Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–
1976, Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2006; Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars 
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“using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with such 
criminals enhances the host-nation government’s legitimacy.”130 This is essential for 
implementation once control measures have been imposed, as the HN needs to “have an 
established system of punishments for various offenses” and needs to be consistent 
throughout the territory.131 Police who abide by the rule of law are the preferred force to 
field during this period, and should have a prominent presence both day and night.132  
3. Intelligence and Information Operations  
FM 3-24 states that “COIN is an intelligence war.”133 In all wars, intelligence 
drives operations; however, the counterinsurgent’s actions among the civil population are 
uniquely and invaluably important to acquiring consistent and accurate information. Use 
of informants and constant exploitation of tactical intelligence is crucial. This is done 
through a variety of steps ranging from intelligence at the front-end of operations, 
including intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and tactical level intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Intelligence should be closely 
coordinated to properly act upon valuable, time-sensitive intelligence; collaboration is a 
very important component to this endeavor.   
According to FM 3-24, information operations also play a key role in 
economizing force while limiting coercive actions. These are the umbrella over the 
multiple lines of operations that are constantly and simultaneously focused across a 
variety of military, political, and economic objectives, to include; combat operations, 
working with HN security forces, providing essential services, maintaining governance, 
and fostering economic development.134 
Persuasion through various psychological operations is essential to balancing the 
coercive offense-defense continuum as described in the doctrine. The doctrine 
emphasizes the importance of IO addressing specific concerns and informing the public 
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and managing perceptions. IO should not be used to commit to actions that cannot be 
completed. Working with the media is necessary to facilitate accurate and timely flow of 
information to the population.135 
IO has specific roles to play in the strategic approaches. In “clear-hold-build” 
there are two key audiences: the local population and the insurgents. For the population, 
the message should focus on gaining and maintaining their support, but also provide the 
understanding that actively supporting the insurgency will prolong combat operations, 
creating “risk to themselves and neighbors.”136 The message to the insurgents should 
constantly remind them that their resistance is futile and that alternatives exist through 
surrender or cease fire. The IO effort should also reinforce the U.S. and HN’s resolve and 
commitment to the effort. The message during the “build” phase is to obtain the 
understanding or approval of security-force actions that affect the populous (e.g., control 
measures), establish intelligence sources that assist in the destruction of remaining 
insurgent infrastructure, and win over the neutral people.137 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The following provides a summary of the principles extracted from the FM 3-24 
doctrine relating to operational approaches and standards:  
• Securing and protecting the population is fundamental in gaining legitimacy. 
Clearing areas of insurgent activity through combat operations, holding an area 
through limited control measures, and building physical and government 
infrastructure are essential for fostering stability, legitimacy for the host-nation, 
and de-legitimizing the efforts of the insurgency.138 This is achieved through 
limited coercion and considerable persuasion.  
                                                 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., 177 
137 Ibid. 
138 Legitimacy for the HN and COIN forces transcends as a means to a long-term, stable political end-state. To 
achieve legitimacy, there must be an associated commitment at the onset (and enduring throughout) the mission in 
order to secure, and sustain, legitimacy from the population.  
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• Offensive operations should be limited in scope, and only executed as a broader, 
synchronized effort to “clear” an area. Killing of civilians should be avoided at all 
costs. The level of collateral damage must be assessed prior to conducting 
operations, so as to avoid creating an environment that is hostile to COIN efforts. 
HN forces should take the lead, or at least work in conjunction with U.S. forces, 
whenever possible.  
• Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support. Carefully coordinated 
control measures must be implemented. Recommended measures include: 
conducting a census; creating identification cards; establishing curfews, pass 
systems, and checkpoints; and placing limits on travel and visitors, including 
within regions, the country, and across international borders.  
• Offensive operations and control measures are to be integrated through a strict 
minimum force construct that are discriminate in application and proportional to 
what is necessary to adequately address the given scope of the threat.  
• Intelligence drives all operations and must be carefully integrated during pre-
deployment procedures, on the ground between various assets, and facilitated 
through a rigorous analysis and dissemination. Information operations are 
essential in balancing the offense-defense continuum, and use of force with 
persuasion, as well as managing the relationships between COIN forces and the 
population. 
• Host-nation security forces are a core component of COIN operations but should 
not be a mirror-image of the U.S. Considerable effort will be needed to develop 
their ability to provide reasonable levels of internal security with adherence to 
rule of law.  
The first operational approach—“clear-hold-build”—is most consistent with the 
“gold standard;” has been optimized to be the core concept in both Iraq and Afghanistan; 
and has been singled out to continue and evolve in the forthcoming FM revision. The 
origins come directly from Thompson’s writings and emphasize the value of “clearing” 
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insurgent forces. Yet, the gravity of those clearing operations is carefully framed through 
a minimum and discriminate use of force that is proportional to the threat. Though this 
should provide the commander with a breadth of options, the stated ‘paradoxes’ appear to 
stymie and limit possibilities to wield force that is balanced with the persuasive aspects of 
the effort. According to the doctrine, the slightest increase in offensive force could derail 
previous or ongoing efforts to gain the trust of, and thoroughly protect, the population. 
Similarly, this also affects what mechanisms are used to implement population control. 
 42 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter compares and analyzes the “gold standard” with current U.S. 
principles. The first section offers some general observations that reinforce the broader 
theoretical distinctions between the “gold standard” principles and U.S. COIN doctrine. 
The second half deciphers what ‘consistency’ and ‘deviation’ exist between the two sets 
of principles within the confines of those drawn from findings of Chapter II and three 
cores themes discussed in Chapter III.  
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS  
As will be discussed in more depth throughout this chapter, there are surprisingly 
no major deviations between the “gold standard” and U.S. doctrine in the level of 
destruction deemed necessary during the “clear” phase of operations—a concept directly 
extracted from Thompson’s writings. This is at odds with the original assumptions 
articulated in the hypotheses as outlined in Chapter I, which were that U.S. COIN 
doctrine does not adequately recognize and account for the importance of coercion in 
COIN warfare.139  When it comes to conducting offensive operations, the doctrines are 
consistent, albeit with caveats. 
Strict population controls, on the other hand, are more consistent with the original 
assumptions of coercion found to be effective in the “gold standard” experience 
compared to the limited methods found in FM 3-24. This deviation has more to do with 
civil rights than human rights, a distinction that Trevett describes as “conflated” in 
Western COIN thinking, where there are vague or absent designations between the two 
areas.140 Much of this may have to do with the inherent democratic values in Western 
                                                 
139 Though not entirely consistent with the breath of this research, Dr. Christopher Paul’s two-year research 
culminated in the 2010 RAND publication, Victory has a Thousand Fathers, which came to some interesting and 
noteworthy conclusions about FM 3-24. That concluded that of the cases studied between 1978 and 2008, “there were a 
remarkably strong correlation between the application of FM 3–24 principles and success in counterinsurgency.” Yet, 
the cases and writing reviewed in this research occurred prior to 1978, and are well cited as the foundation from which 
the doctrine supposedly replicated. Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill. Victory has a Thousand Fathers: 
Sources of Success in COIN, RAND, National Defense Research Institute, 2010.  
140 Michael Trevett, Isolating the Guerrilla (Oklahoma: Tate Publishing, 2011), 29. 
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thinking that places an equally high premium on both types of rights. Aside from these 
noted distinctions, minor nuances were found within each section relevant to coercive 
actions, as will be discussed below. 
The following represents the analysis of the core aforementioned distinctions, as 
framed in the previous chapters.  
1. Destruction of Insurgents  
As summarized below in Table I, the distinction between the “gold standard” and 
U.S. doctrine as to how force is employed is minimal. U.S. doctrine carefully states that 
insurgents must be killed and that clearing operations entail combat operations. This, in 
practice, is shared by nearly every theorist reviewed, and was executed to one degree or 
another in Algeria, Malaya, and most other conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
FM 3-24 actually replicated and adapted Thompson’s work into its operational approach 
of “clear-hold-build.” Though sugar-coated by the HAM connotations and idealistic 
notion of nation-building (note the “build” phase meant to support the host-nation and 
“paradoxes” overall), FM 3-24 is conflicted in balancing the utility of carefully planned 
sweep operations, and the need to kill enemy combatants who are steadfast in their efforts 



















Table 1.   Comparison between “Gold Standard and U.S. Doctrine with Respect to 
Destruction of Insurgents141 
Consistency between Principles  Deviation between Principles  
A. Acknowledge that insurgents should be 
destroyed or expunged during 
calculated phases of operations 
commonly stated as “clearing,” and in 
cases where capture or reconciliation is 
untenable.  
B. Sweeps are necessary through clearing 
operations. FM 3-24 borrows from 
(albeit, modifies) Thompson’s concept 
of clear-hold-build, and the 19th 
century “oil-spot” methodology of the 
French.  
A. In U.S. doctrine, offensive operations 
should be limited in scope, and are only 
to be executed as a broader, 
synchronized effort to “clear” an area. 
The “gold standard” is inconsistent on 
this issue. 
B. There is a clear distinction with HN 
forces taking the lead in U.S. doctrine, 
as opposed to the “gold standard,” 
where the inclusion of indigenous 
forces was limited, or were often part 
of the problem in excessive use of 
force against insurgents. 
C. U.S. doctrine emphasizes that the 
killing of civilians should be avoided at 
all costs. The level of collateral damage 
must be assessed prior to conducting 
operations. This was rarely the case 
and was inconsistently stated in the 
“gold standard.”  
 
Though there is general recognition in what counterinsurgency author and 
Vietnam veteran Boyd Bashore observed that “A counterinsurgency doctrine that does 
not recognize the primacy of the military forces in providing security is doomed to 
failure,” there seems to still be some philosophical issues between the “gold standard,” 
current U.S. doctrine, and presumably the forthcoming revision with respect to politically 
acceptable levels of violence military forces employ.142 Merom argues that a particular 
concern for modern democracies like the U.S., as well as HNs, is the disagreement 
 
                                                 
141 Ibid 75. In this phase, satisfactory results are reflected in the permanent expulsion or disbanding into another 
area as long as they are unable to regroup. The latter can only be satisfied if COIN forces are left in place.  
142 Boyd T. Bashore, “The Parallel Hierarchies,” pt. 2, Infantry 58 (July–August 1968): 11. 
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between state and society over “expedient and moral issues that concern human life and 
dignity,” which can trump the requirements presented in the U.S. COIN doctrine and, at 
times, the “gold standard.”143  
This does not mean, however, that indiscriminant acts of violence are to be 
accepted or tolerated. Such methods constantly discredited the French in Algeria, as well 
as the U.S. in Vietnam. The world, in general, has advanced beyond such blanketed 
ethnocentrism and brutality. The U.S. has evolved in its thinking since its experience in 
Vietnam. For instance, the philosophy of Major General R.B. Mans in 1962 was 
indicative of the general position that the U.S. “will work them over with so much steel, 
that in six months [we] will see an end of it.”144 Again, such comments offer punctuation 
to patterns of the past and are at odds with the restraint displayed in current doctrine.145 
This theme was echoed throughout the “gold standard.”   
What is important to keep in mind, is that the “use of force and repression… or 
the ‘crush them’ approach works well in some phases of the insurgency” [emphasis 
added], while recognizing that this alone is not a means to an end.146 Thomas Marks 
alludes to this point in his observation that “The civilian population is both a means and 
the battlefield… Violence can be seen as the ultimate enabler shaping the battlefield 
space for politics.”147 George Kennan also warned not to rely too much on limited force 
models. In 1954 he observed that “even benevolence, when addressed to a foreign people, 
represents a form of intervention into their internal affairs, and always receives, at best, a 
divided reception.”148 Alas, the effort to balance these nuances is difficult and must be 
accompanied with multiple lines of engagement outside of kinetic operations and beyond 
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the military sphere of affairs, while at the same time, not losing sight of the military’s 
importance for reaching desired outcomes.   
Beyond the philosophical analysis are the practical issues revealed in the “gold 
standard.” For instance, when there are clearing operations, there must be resources to 
support the initiative. The problem for the French was not in their ability to clear, but 
their inability to project the appropriate military resources—and political will—to act 
upon the gains they had made against the ALN during the Challe offensive and beyond. 
In fact, the political objective was compromised with de Gaulle’s decision to implement a 
“self-determination policy, which significantly upset the disaffected pieds noirs” (French 
citizens who lived and occupied Algeria pre-independence) to a point where he had to 
redeploy French forces into major cities to control the upheaval.149 The British, on the 
other hand, had significantly more resources in Malaya, per capita, than the U.S. has in 
either Iraq or Afghanistan in the 2000s.  
2. Static Forces and Military Outposts  
The lessons learned regarding isolated military outposts are reflected in both sets 
of principles as summarized in Table II below. Once again, at the practical level, there 
were manpower issues—both quantitatively and qualitatively in establishing and 
maintaining static forces and military outposts. The French had a difficult time properly 
manning posts in both Algeria and Vietnam. For example, Porch explains that “The 
French lacked the manpower to be strong everywhere, and a surge in one region came at 
                                                 
149 Porch 109 and Merom 88. For instance, Massu was able to pacify Algiers of virtually all the FLN terror 
networks to include logistical support, fighters, bombers and leadership—essentially the entire infrastructure to operate. 
Yet, despite all of the tactical and operational gains “The FLN achieved its political objectives in full: It was recognized 
as the sole representative of the Algerians, Algeria was granted independence, and its national unity and territorial 
integrity were secured.” The French were forced to withdraw all “vestiges of institutions” and “civil presence.” Much 
of the issue had to do with imperialist aims where the “most powerful politicians in France were firmly committed to 
the idea of preserving French Algeria, if need be by every means necessary.” 
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the cost of operating another to Viet Mien attack.”150 Nearly endless military means were 
required as a result; this was apparent to the French a century earlier.151  
Table 2.   Comparison between “Gold Standard” and U.S. Doctrine with Respect to 
Static Forces and Military Outposts.  
Consistency between Principles  Deviation between Principles 
A. Acknowledge the importance of static outposts. 
This is most clearly articulated in two core 
areas of overlap with U.S. doctrine: the “hold” 
phase as presented by Thompson and replicated 
in the U.S. doctrine, and the French “oil spot” 
strategy (again, originally a 19th century 
approach). 
 
B. Like Britain, the U.S. also uses foreign troops 
to augment, albeit in a different capacity via 
coalition forces. These forces have been 
essential when holding areas and deploying 
forces on a sustained basis and where local 




A. Static forces for the “gold standard” in many 
cases differed from U.S. doctrine in three ways: 
first is the deployment and fielding of foreign 
and indigenous forces that were at the disposal 
of the COIN force. The British were especially 
known for this, vis-à-vis Gurka battalions. 
Second, settlement was a core component to 
supplementing additional, local resources and 
added to the demand for more from the 
homeland to protect the colonial population 
(e.g. Algeria).152  Lastly, at times, both the 
French and British relied on conscription to fill 
their rank. As a result, professionalism among 
the ranks suffered (this has not been an option 
for the U.S. since 1972). 
 
B. Even with those additional assets, the French 
lacked the capacity to properly integrate the 
“ink spot” method.  
                                                 
150 Porch, 96–98. As of 1947, more troops were not an option for the French in Indochina while the government 
was in the midst of trying to reconstruct France after being “devastated by war, occupation, strikes, and inflation.” This 
would set the stage for the ‘Vietnamization’ to follow; unfortunately, the results were not lasting. 
151 Octavian Manea, Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion: An Interview with Etienne de 
Durand,” Small Wars Journal, March 3, 2011. As Durand explains, “Gallieni and Lyautey were acutely aware of the 
limited nature of the campaign they led. At no point were they under any illusion as to whether France would bear 
endless costs to extend French influence or sovereignty over distant colonial outposts.  
152  Basil Williams, The British Empire. Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, no. 129 (Henry Holt 
and Company: New York. 1928), 169. Settlement was a core distinction in both 19th and 20th century COIN 
endeavors, as it was hallmark of colonial rule and a vital appendage to the respective Empire (declining or otherwise). 
As a result, much of the decisions, administration, and politics were entwined with the local settlers. This excerpt from 
Basil Williams’ history of the British Empire offers a case-in-point when describing the situation in South Africa: “The 
climate is well suited to Europeans and some ten thousand are now settled there. The Crown has vested in itself all the 
land in Kenya and, largely under pressure from local settlers, has made enormous grants to Europeans and regulated the 
native tribes to less adventurous reserves, while even there they have not found permanent possession. In addition, it 
has been the policy of the white settlers, which they have to a certain extent been able to persuade the local officials to 
enforce, to discourage the Masai and other natives from growing marketable produce on their reserves and to tax them 
at a relatively high rate, in order to induce them to supply the labor urgently needed for the proper cultivation of their 
own large estates [sic].” 
 49 
The second overarching distinction is the degree of professionalism of the “static 
forces” intended to interact with the population. For the French in Algeria, much of the 
issue in abusing force had to do with blatant lack of discipline and professionalism. In 
theory, the French effort to increase its numbers in 1955 would be the necessary answer 
toward resolving the military and political situation on the ground. Yet, the quality of the 
force became the issue. The French force was largely a collection of conscripts, 
“scattered in isolated, morale-extinguishing posts…”153 Britain, too, experienced 
problems of quantity and quality. In Britain, policing of empire was considered to be a 
“sub-war category” and [of] poor preparation.”154 In contrast, the U.S. recognizes the 
need for professional soldiers to conduct COIN operations.  
Thus, both the quality and quantity of forces (and associated resources) played a 
major role in shaping the “gold standard.” As explained by Douglas Macgregor, “military 
power is no longer based on the mass mobilization of manpower and resources of the 
entire nation-state. Conscript armed forces, the norm of the 19th and 20th centuries, are 
being replaced with professional military establishments” that are smaller, but 
technologically more lethal in scale.155 Similarly, a force ration in U.S. doctrine 
continues to be an issue and has been devoid of the necessary requirements that “clear-
hold-build” and “oil-spot” require, even as these strategies are recommended.156  
                                                 
153 Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare 1945–62,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, eds. 
Malkasian and Marston (Osprey: Oxford. 2008), 105. As Porch explains further: “Initially, all divisions were under 
strength and under officered. Detachments returned from Indochina exhausted and depleted. With veterans declining to 
re-enlist and soldiers deserting at high rates, units topped up with young, inexperienced recruits… Well-equipped 
professionals, with their distinctive uniforms repaid the envy of conscripts with distain. Moreover, tactical ineptitude in 
general was reflective in the inability to shift from the day-to-day tactical priorities that were necessary to implement 
the Constantine Plan.”  
154 Ibid.  
155 Octavian Manea, Small Wars Inquiry, comments by Douglas Macgregor, Small Wars Journal, May 10, 2011, 
4.   
156 For further analysis, see United States Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Revision Issue Paper #2—Force 
Ratios, Memorandum (Ft. Leavenworth, KN: Combined Arms Center, U.S. Counterinsurgency Center, January 20, 
2012).  
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3. Insurgents Must be Isolated from the Population  
Clearly, one of the biggest problems in both past and contemporary COIN is not 
in the realization that the population must be isolated from the insurgency, but how to 
deal with the cases where the population does not want to be secured and controlled. This 
has become an issue at various points in the recent Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns; 
however, this is not unique to these cases, and was addressed throughout the “gold 
standard” experience (as explained in Chapter 3).  
Table 3.    Comparison between “Gold Standard” and U.S. Doctrine with Respect to 
How Insurgents Must be Isolated from the Population  
Consistency between Principles  Deviation between Principles  
A. Isolating the insurgents from the 
population is an imperative. Best 
practices are those that follow the 
rule of law proportionality.  
 
B. Practices should take into account 
context, culture, and ethnic 
cleavages.  
A. Many of the experiences outlined in 
the British “gold standard” included 
more coercive and extreme forms 
of resettlement, regroupment, and 
even deportation, which were often 
codified by law. While varied 
across conflicts, the more 
successful examples were carefully 
planned, resourced, and executed 
across the population.  
 
B. Even the 19th century “ink spot” 
method (that the U.S. doctrine very 
consistently uses in its own 
version) relied more upon racial 
profiling and was heavily 
dependent on resources.  
 
In fact, population control is perhaps the key area where FM 3-24 deviates from 
the “gold standard” as summarized in the table above. Though there is recognition in both 
that control measures are necessary in order to secure the population, the methodology 
differs; this is specifically the case with regard to the issue of food controls, as well as 
resettlement. FM 3-24 does not recommend such coercive and punitive actions. While 
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there is overlap in the language of minimum force, the principles found throughout the 
“gold standard” was broader and perhaps stressed more in achieving certain outcomes in 
those colonial conflicts. This is quite different in U.S. doctrine. The prime examples 
reside with resettlement, strategic hamlets, and strict pass systems, which are absent from 
U.S. doctrine.  
Essentially, the distinction in population controls and the use of coercion boils 
down to the difference between the “gold standard’s” strict coercion (like food control 
and relocation via strategic hamlets), and limited coercion (through census, surveys, and 
pass systems). Though both strict and limited coercion could be effective through 
discriminate and proportional force, FM 3-24 has truncated the options deviating from 
the “gold standard.”157   
Interestingly, the highly coercive actions found in the “gold standard’s” best 
practice are at times representative of the principle of strict proportional laws and 
restrictions imposed on the entire population as opposed to collective punishments and 
indiscriminate detention. Under such conditions, forbidden zones, food controls and other 
methods were sometimes accepted by the population as fair. U.S. doctrine provides 
similar flexibility in discussing the standards of “proportionality” and “discrimination of 
force.” However, whether on the lower end of coercion with curfews and census taking, 
or high-end with food controls and resettlement, both “gold standard” and U.S. doctrine 
reveal that a clear picture of the culture, ethnic diversity, and particular circumstances 
should have a significant impact on the decision of what methods are most applicable.158  
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There are simply not enough forces to properly field, especially if the mandate is narrow and geography is vast (e.g., 
size variation between Malaya and that of Afghanistan or Algeria). Also, normative thought may provoke the impulse 
to associate this ommitance as a result of democratic values alone. Yet, there is probably more credence to the fact that 
the U.S. attempted some of these methods unsuccessfully, in Vietnam. There are significant human rights norms and 
international referendums in place now that help deter from such extreme methods. Lastly, as was seen late and 
reluctantly in Iraq and Afghanistan, indigenous, HN, forces can help with the “boots on the ground issues. 
158 Mathias, Galula in Algeria, 29. Mathias describes the French experience with conducting a census as one that 
was rift with cultural controversies. He notes that though such “strategy seems coherent,” there were significant issues 
with “organizing its undertaking in a Muslim country where the collection of public records faced numerous cultural 
obstacles....” He cites examples like the lack of surnames, lack of recorded birthdates, rampant illiteracy, and 
photographs for women as cultural sacrilege as among the many hurdles. Such constraints are worth noting in all the 
various experiences with population controls used.  
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4. Importance of Intelligence 
As noted in Table 4, intelligence methods are consistent between both the “gold 
standard” and U.S. doctrine emphasizing three main areas: intelligence is vital at the 
tactical levels, informers are critical, and local police forces are a critical element in 
intelligence. One area that seems deficient in U.S. doctrine is the conduits that are 
exploited (e.g., political intelligence) and the regular use of torture to elicit information, 
which was common in the British and French cases. 
Table 4.   Comparison between “Gold Standard” and U.S. Doctrine with Respect to 
Intelligence as an Imperative for Successful COIN Operations 
Consistency between Principles   Deviation between Principles   
A. Intelligence is the primary driver 
behind successful operations. 
 
B. Emphasizes that informants should 
be acquired, appropriate 
bureaucratic networks maintained, 
and that intelligence collection is 
local and should be broken down by 
district and sub-district levels. 
A.  Notwithstanding technological and 
organizational differences between 
historic and modern methods, there 
are three primary deviations found 
in the “gold standard:” its emphasis 
on political intelligence in terms of 
overtly and actively meddling in 
day-to-day political affairs, and the 
sporadic use of torture and other 
techniques that are less acceptable 
to today’s U.S and international law 
standards.  
 
5. The Intrinsic and Extrinsic Political Realm 
There has been an evolution of COIN approaches over time with regard to 
political aspirations, strategic ambitions, and international acceptance or rejection for 
certain behaviors. Where U.S. doctrine is mostly concerned with the support of a 
sovereign and HN in the context of promoting and sustaining global strategic stability, 




centuries-old imperial power and patronage. This was seen throughout the British 
Empire, as well as the French in their dealing with Indochina (Vietnam) and the piros 
nodem in Algeria.159  
Table 5.   Comparison between “Gold Standard” and U.S. Doctrine with Respect to 
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Political Dynamics 
Consistency between Principles Deviation between Principles  
A. Political resolve is a core 
component in COIN. Without 
political resolve, there cannot be 
stability.  
A. There is a core distinction that 
questions the feasibility of modern, 
U.S. COIN: while the U.S. subjects 
itself to the legitimacy and 
capabilities of the HN it is 
supporting, the European 
experience contrarily focused on 
setting the conditions for political 
resolve either through tampering 
with internal processes, 
disassociating political decision-
making that was not aligned with 
their interests, or conceding to 
certain conditions that are not 
applicable to the U.S. HN model 
(e.g., agreeing to the independence 
of the state from colonial control as 
a means to reach a final end-state is 
not relevant under the U.S. model 
of assisting a sovereign HN as 
described in FM 3-24).  
 
                                                 
159 Another less cited and appreciated case study on managing the political dynamics in COIN was the British in 
Borneo. As high commissioner, General Templar, in Malaya, had directed all civil and military activities. He headed 
both the civil government and the armed forces. In Borneo, Walker’s experience was much different. His powers were 
more circumscribed, since he did not represent the British Crown. Walker, instead of being in charge of the territory, 
provided only military assistance to the existing governments. The sultanate of Brune was independent; thus, Walker 
always had to respond to the sultan as Brunei’s head of state. Moreover, because Sarawak and Sabah were administered 
separately, Walker had to deal with two separate administrations and police forces, each with their own chain of 
command. As a result, Walker was forced to rely more on cooperation and persuasion than had Templer. When 
Sarawak and Sabah joined Malaysia in 1965, Walker’s situation became even more complex, as he now had to serve a 
new master in Kuala Lumpur. 
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“Divide and conquer,” population controls through resettlement, and strategic 
administration through emigrated citizens, are absent in U.S., third-party COIN. 
Even so, both the “gold standard” and U.S. doctrine emphasize the importance of 
a political resolution to conflict with the internal political environment playing a 
significant role.  
6. Information Operations (IO)  
Aside from semantics, there is quite a bit of overlap with regard to information 
operations as noted in the table below. Both sets of principles emphasize the importance 
of IO to influence three distinct actors: the enemy, the population, and the COIN force. 
U.S. doctrine focuses on some of the core lessons from the gold standard, such as, not 
committing to actions that could not be completed. Despite these similarities, the “gold 
standard” still reveals some key lessons and distinctions.  
Some of the core differences preside in how information is disseminated today. 
Media exposure, and access to information more generally, is near limitless; something 
that was either narrow or nonexistent in the past. No doubt the exposure, breadth and 
access that populations (friendly, enemy, and neutral) have to information are 
unparalleled in the magnitude where public opinion and “battlefield feedback” is 
absorbed within modern society. Additionally, there is no single institution in the United 
States that focuses exclusively on IO as was the case pre-1999 under the U.S. Information 
Agency (USIA). Having such civilian oversight and responsibility was a central concern 
for Thompson in particular.160  
 
 
                                                 
160 Granted, Thompson was operating locally, and spoke from that position. Today, not much has changed at the 
operational level, however, the scope of modern, networked adversaries requires an equally global campaign. Even 
though the scope has changed under these conditions, the need for a separate entity that deals with the various levels of 
IO (especially global) is a strategic imperative in the 21st century.  
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Table 6.   Comparison between “Gold Standard” and U.S. Doctrine with Respect to 
Information Operations.  
Consistency between Principles Deviation between Principles 
A. The target audience for IO 
(propaganda) operations should 
focus on three actors: the enemy, 
the population, and the COIN force 
itself.  
B. The goal of IO is to help create and 
sustain the conditions that: a) deter 
the population from supporting the 
insurgency; and b) help foster and 
strengthen the political dynamics of 
the particular village, district, or 
province.   
A. There is more emphasis in the U.S. 
doctrine with regard to media 
outlets on information flow. 
B. Thompson specifically felt that all 
IO should be an “internal political 
matter” and should primarily be a 
“civilian responsibility.” Though 
Thompson was specifically 
speaking about local operations, 
there is still much vitality in his 
point. Today, the U.S. is also 
concerned with the message at the 
global level, transcending various 
players across all regions of the 
world; still, Thompson’s underlying 
premise is still applicable. By using 
various government and civilian 
organizations, like that of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
for instance, IO matters have lacked 
the luster of what Thompson 
describes with an independent, 
civilian institution. This is 
especially the case since the 
disbanding of the U.S. Information 
Agency (USIA) that focused on 
such issues.  
 
7. The Use of Indigenous Forces  
The final and arguably most important element to sustaining a COIN endeavor is 
the aptitude, commitment, and sustainment of indigenous forces to maintain pressure on 
the insurgency and prevent its return. Here, the “gold standard” was mostly focused on 
using local police and militias (known as “Home Guard” among other things) who could 
maintain control (especially in following the strategic hamlet model). Yet, where the U.S. 
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tries avoiding the “gold standard’s” mishaps in supporting local forces that are under-
trained and not properly supported by the government, it falters when it attempts to 
replicate HN forces in the image of U.S. forces. This becomes obvious when the 
Afghanistan Army—after a decade of mentorship and training—offers complains about 
its musical band’s equipment as being substandard.161 HN forces cannot become 
dependent on the U.S. for their existence.  
Table 7.   Comparison between “Gold Standard” and U.S. Doctrine with Respect to 
the Use of Indigenous Forces   
Consistency between Lists Deviation between Lists 
A. Acknowledge the importance of 
fielding local security forces.  
B. There is shared concern (mostly an 
afterthought in the European 
experience) in the importance of 
how the force will be compensated 
(e.g., salary and pensions). All note 
the importance of this both in terms 
of preventing corruption, 
maintaining a competent and 
disciplined force, and the eventual 
demobilization of excess forces.   
C. Indigenous forces would typically 
resemble the COIN force. Though 
this was more of the point in many 
(not all) of the European cases, and 
not supported by the U.S. doctrine 
per say, most cases show that the 
residual, local force has been left 
with the same tactics, ethos, and 
even organizational structure as 
modern, westernized militaries.  
A. The “gold standard” hints at more 
compulsory service (e.g. 
Trinquier), which is not supported 
within the U.S. doctrine. Moreover, 
this is a broader political issue that 
resides with the HN; whether this is 
covered in U.S. doctrine or not is 
moot.  
B. The “gold standard” cases were 
mostly concerned with providing 
localized security to implement the 
strategy in the interests of the 
COIN power, not necessarily the 
HN. On the contrary, U.S. doctrine 
is concerned with building a HN 
force that can sustain itself, be 
loyal to its constitution, and 
provide security. Thus, where both 
doctrines are concerned with the 
establishment of local forces, the 
broader, strategic ambition is quite 
distinct for the U.S.  
 
                                                 
161 Dawn.com, “From M16s to boots, Afghan troops feel slighted.” Dawn.com (Pakistan), May 21, 2012, 
www.dawn.com.  
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
A. IMPLICATIONS 
COIN is a category of warfare that has evolved on multiple levels, two of which 
have been examined here: first the overarching strategic motivation driving the effort, 
and second, broader shifts in societal and international norms and laws. Both reveal the 
crux of what differentiates U.S. COIN with the defined “gold standard.” At the same 
time, its essence is entrenched in what Douglas Porch describes as “the 
professionalization of European warfare in the nineteenth century, and the emergence of 
a coherent doctrine of subversion in the twentieth.”162  
As discussed in the previous chapters, the fundamentals behind FM 3-24 are 
rooted in the principles learned by the European imperial powers’ experiences from the 
19th century; their efforts to retain legitimacy and control over what they considered to 
be their sovereign territories during the 20th; and eventual attempts to transition colonial 
assets to independence favorable to European interest. Where the U.S. experience most 
deviates from these cases is fighting as an outside foreign actor and striving to shape the 
regime type of the target nation. This approach presents a number of constraints that 
simply were not a concern during the British and French experiences of imperial policing 
and wars of independence. Accordingly, there are differences in fighting as outsiders that 
are not consistent with “gold standard” norms.163  
Yet, the liberal democratic virtue of human rights, combined with the demand for 
immediate results embedded in the psyche of a  modern world accustomed to speedy 
                                                 
162 Porch, 4 
163 United States Army. Minutes from COIN Brownbag Webcast with Dr. Christopher Paul (Defense Connect 
Online), Ft. Leavenworth, KN: United States Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, 
September 29, 2011. Also see Gregor Mathias, Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory, Oxford: 
Praeger, 2011, 7. He explains that the first few chapters of Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare “are based primarily 
on his Chinese experience and describe the general traits of revolutionary warfare, the victory conditions of 
insurrection, and insurgent doctrine. His conclusion emphasizes a Chinese geopolitical vision.”  Steven Metz posited 
that “the Cold War/Maoist model of insurgency applied in situations where new segments of society were becoming 
politically aware or mobilized and thus made demands on the state which it could not fulfill. These demands were both 
tangible—infrastructure, security, education—and intangible (a sense of identity). See Octavian Manea, Interview with 
Steven Metz, “Pros and Cons on Galula Model,” Small Wars Journal, November 23, 2010.  
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results may have created an Achilles Heel for U.S. COIN, so much so that words like 
“centric” have been misleadingly attached to the importance of the population. This has 
created a misinterpretation of what COIN entailed in the past and a misunderstanding of 
concepts needed to successfully conduct COIN.164  
This is not to say that FM 3-24 is wholly misguided. As discussed in Chapter IV, 
this is quite the contrary. The doctrine is consistent with the “gold standard” in many 
areas and has provided a relatively solid starting point for the U.S. military and 
intelligence community to build their philosophical and organizational constructs to 
address COIN warfare. With that said, U.S. COIN is still inadequate in the fundamental 
areas that have brought the desired results in the past. FM 3-24 has been a formulaic 
document, not one that garners enough breadth to appreciate the tactics and methods 
necessary on a case-to-case basis. Moreover, the formula itself ignores much of the 
history from which it has been calculated. The elements of the doctrine that do capture 
lessons do so by misunderstanding or misinterpreting reality as discussed in Chapter IV.    
Here, there must be a realistic understanding that many of the measures used in 
the past are no longer viable, and for that reason, the fundamental challenge is not 
necessarily military or political, but shifting morality.165 Yet, this also necessitates as 
much of a commitment to not succumb to what Gil Merom describes as a tendency for 
democracies failing in small wars because “they find it extremely difficult to escalate the 
level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory.”166 Nor should we 
succumb to what Hack describes as the “temporal” and “spatial” fallacies that dilute the 
true essence and complexity of COIN from one moment of—time, region, province, 
                                                 
164 United States Army, Minutes from COIN Brownbag Webcast with Dr. Sean Kalic and Dr. Jon Mikolashek 
(Ft. Leavenworth, KN: United States Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, August 18, 2011).  
165 See Martin Van Crevald, The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq (Presidio 
Press: New York, 2007).  
166 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel 
in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15. There are three 
issues with regard to democracies fighting a COIN war: how to reconcile the brutal requirements of counterinsurgency 
warfare with an educated class, how to find a domestic trade-off between brutality and sacrifice, and preserving support 
without jeopardizing the democratic systems. 
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district, village, force, etc.—to another.167 As Thomas Mockaitis noted, “doctrine is only 
as good as its application,” while the tactics incorporated in the doctrine are also not a 
sufficient solution to fixing complex political issues.168   
B. (CURRENT) STATUS OF FM 3-24 REVISION  
Over the past year or so, there has been significant work dedicated to the FM 3-24 
revision. Modifications range from definitional issues, force rations, and revisiting the 
original operational frameworks. In regard to the operational framework in particular, the 
forthcoming revision intends to consider “ink spot” to be a technique to clear-hold-build, 
with “more depth… to address how and when this operational art is applied,” and, “under 
what conditions of an insurgency.”169  There is also discussion about adding language 
like “shape” and “transition” to better articulate the “clear-hold-build” construct for the 
operator (shape-clear-hold-build-transition). This will also encompass what is being 
described as “strata” to better contextualize “deliberate phases.”170 
Even though these are significant strides that reflect some of the primary issues 
with the theoretical and contextual imbalances suggested in the research, there still seems 
to be a lack of clarity on what control measures may help in these approaches. Time will 
tell whether the current doctrinal revision will maintain the existing deviation from the 
“gold standard,” or if lessons from the 20th century will be revisited and properly applied 
(with obvious caveats relating to human rights issues).   
                                                 
167 Karl Hack, “Setting the Record Straight on Malayan Counterinsurgency Strategy,” interview by Octavian 
Manea, Small Wars Journal, February 11, 2011. He defines temporal fallacy as “policies abstracted from one defining 
moment [that] might be equally valid quantitatively [at] different phases.” Spatial fallacy is, therefore, the mistake in 
assuming that “different geographical regions will be in the same phase, so allowing a single strategy for country no 
matter how fractured or diverse. 
168 Octavian Manea, Interview with Thomas Mockaittis, in, “COIN—A Culture of Entitlement,” Small Wars 
Journal, December 20, 2011.     
169 United States Army. FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, Revision Issue Paper #3—Clear-Hold-Build,  
Memorandum (Ft. Leavenworth, KN: Combined Arms Center, U.S. Counterinsurgency Center, January 20, 2012). 
170 Ibid. The precise terminology has changed a few times through the revision process, where the world 
transition has, and has not, been use. A list of other published recommendations is as follows: hat the U.S. Army 
redefines the operational art for conducting COIN using precise terminology, reducing confusion. That the COIN 
doctrine should use secure-control-support Alternative language such as “seize the initiative, retain the initiative, and 
exploit the initiative” has also been discussed and representative of what is found in ADP 3–0.   
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR POTENTIAL RESEARCH  
The belief expressed by General David Petraeus in his 1987 dissertation that 
“what policymakers believe to have taken place in any particular case is what matters 
more than what actually occurred” is no longer sufficient when considering the 
application and ramifications of COIN in the 21st century. As has been discovered in this 
research, there are many valuable aspects to the doctrine that should be retained. At the 
same time, there is much that has been missing from what actually occurred historically. 
No doubt there are modern-day constraints to employing many of the approaches the 
French and British used in the 19th and 20th centuries. Below are recommendations for 
how to reframe the doctrine. 
1. Forget “Hearts and Minds” (HAM)  
HAM-centered doctrines are too simplistic and lead to a misunderstanding about 
the true nature of COIN.171 Though FM 3-24 only uses the HAM term once, the language 
is rift with its innuendo.172 The problem is that HAM does not accurately represent the 
cases from which U.S. doctrine is supposedly derived.   
One important lesson to reinforce, however, is that cruelty undercuts legitimacy 
“charging the social battery of the insurgency.”173  With that said, there are contextual, 
practical, and theoretical issues with HAM that must be addressed provided that it will 
continue to have an influence.  
                                                 
171 Austin Long, “On ‘Other War:’ Lessons from Five Decades of RAND COIN Research,” National Defense 
Research Institute, 2006. A 2006 RAND study associated HAM with modernization; this is essentially how the British 
brokered the theory for themselves. The pace of that development and modernization is fundamentally different in the 
contemporary era. As described by Austin Long: Scholars observed that, in which the developed nations adjusted over 
the course of decades and centuries were being experienced in the space of years by the developing countries. As the 
economic conditions underlying society began to shift, pressure built on traditional society. This, in turn, put pressure 
on nascent governments, many of which had only recently acquired independence from colonial empires, and on those 
empires that sought to retain their colonies. In many cases, governmental institutions could not keep pace with societal 
change, leading to disorder and instability.  
172 The framework of the strategic approach (through “clear-hold-build”), as well as the proscribed paradoxes, 
deduce the same result: that in order to levy support and legitimacy from the population, their HAM must be attained 
through genuine, indirect efforts (e.g., nation-building) coupled with carefully applied force. 
173 Roger Beaumont, “Thinking the Unspeakable: On Cruelty in Small Wars,” The Small Wars Journal 1, issue 1 
(1990): 63. 
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2. Human Rights vs. Civil Rights: Not Mutually Exclusive in COIN 
Kalev Sepp wrote that “The security of people must be assured as a basic need, 
along with food, water, shelter, health care, and means of living. These are human 
rights….”174 This is in-line with the 21st century imperatives found in FM 3-24, that 
maintain a strict standard with regard to human rights: they must never be abused.175 
Though true, this should not be conflated with civil rights. In COIN, and war in 
general for that matter, a certain amount of civil rights are expected to be lessened in 
order to reach political end-states such as security and stability. This is particularly the 
case with certain control measures implemented on the population. Even the more benign 
measures supported in both Sepp’s analysis and FM 3-24, such as curfews and mandatory 
ID cards, are not fully consistent with the modern practice in liberal democracies. In 
reality, COIN techniques used by the British and French in the classical, “gold standard” 
experience “dispensed with civil rights to varying degrees.”176 Proven measures such as 
food controls and resettlement are no doubt more imposing than the latter, but do not 
necessarily infringe on the human rights issues stated by Sepp if properly planned, 
executed, and assessed. In fact, if done with care and correctly, they could better serve 
the population’s basic needs.177 
In war, there must be recognition that, at times, population controls, from benign 
curfews to strict food controls, in an occupation status are necessary for both the 
population’s security and the long-term stability of that particular state.  
3. The Reality of Resettlement 
Two of the most prominent principles that are reflective from the “gold standard” 
principles have been the importance of organized violence against the insurgency and the 
prominence of resettlement and regrouping. Both of these areas—especially the latter—
                                                 
174 Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June, 2005).  
175 Michael Trevett, Isolating the Guerrilla (Oklahoma: Tate Publishing, 2011), 29.  
176 Ibid.  
177 See Kalev Sepp, Resettlement, Regroupment, Reconcentration: Deliberate Government Directed Population 
Relocation in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations (Master’s Thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, KN Command and General 
Staff College, 1992).  
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are detached from our current doctrine. Many agree that this was the correct choice. Yet, 
there may be strategic value in reassessing the issue for the greater good.  
4. Focus on Case Studies, but be Careful  
More study of the history of COIN is needed at all levels of command. This can 
be done, and has increasingly been pushed through various reading lists commissioned 
from the highest levels of the military—from the Joint Chief, to Marine Commandant, 
and others. As Rid postulated: “many of today’s ideas are far less innovative and 
‘revolutionary’ than often assumed. Indeed much can be learned by looking at the 
nineteenth century colonial campaigns.”178 Yet, caution is also warranted. There is no 
silver bullet in studying COIN cases, nor should there be confusion in understanding the 
particular context of which the COIN effort took place before gleaning the actual value of 
its lessons.  
Yet, there are some central principles. As explained by Kalic and Mikolashek, 
“the assimilation of historical lessons learned can provide the tools necessary to analyze, 
discuss, and interpret past events.”179 Thus, advancing the study of cases within doctrine, 
and in conjunction with its guidance, can help commanders properly frame operations at 
every stage of the COIN conflict.  
D. FINAL REMARKS  
Even though COIN has come to the fore in military thinking since the publication 
of FM 3-24, the strategic stasis that has resulted in its suboptimal prosecution is a 
continuing concern. The ultimate unraveling could potentially be COIN warfare 
becoming the pariah in military thinking, where the utterance of the term once again 
                                                 
178 Thomas Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 33, no. 5 (October 2010): abstract.  
179 United States Army, Minutes from COIN Brownbag Webcast with Dr. Sean Kalic and Dr. Jon Mikolashek 
(Ft. Leavenworth, KN: United States Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center, August 18, 2011). 
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becomes a taboo subject in the U.S. military.180  Though there is little argument that 
COIN doctrine has influenced the military writ large, the jury is still out on whether this 
doctrine will be revamped or if the overall concept has become a failed panacea.181  At 
the same time, it would be well to heed the words of Robert E. Lee before the Battle of 
Fredericksburg, where he stated solemnly that: “It is well that war is so terrible, or we 
should grow too fond of it.”182 COIN doctrine defined by nation-building and the noble 
cause to fix societies downtrodden by war and oppression could be something that we 
regret becoming fond of. Porch warns that the United States has already entered a stage 
of neo-imperialism where the events of 9/11 have “jump-started the COIN 
renaissance.”183 
It could also very well become dangerous in the oversight that may exist over the 
stewards of national security—both civilian and military. Sewell’s forward to the COIN 
doctrine sheds light on some of those early concerns:  
In truth, nothing prevents the field manual’s prescriptions from being 
ignored or even used to mask conduct that is counter to its precepts. This 
uncertainly merits skepticism even—especially—from the manuals 
strongest supporters. It also demands close attention from critical 
outsiders. They must monitor military actions in the field, insist that the 
precepts be followed, and support the associated institutional changes to 
make it possible for the military to fulfill the military’s promise.184 
                                                 
180 Some, like David Ucko, believe that “it looks almost inevitable that the term “counterinsurgency” will fall out 
of use.” He offers a variety of reasons and explanations, to include: that it remains a “vague and divisive concept; and 
withdrawal from Afghanistan that will “remove the primary impetus for studying and preparing for 
counterinsurgency.” See David Ucko, “Counterinsurgency and its Discontents: Assessing the Value of a Divisive 
Concept,” SWP Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, April 2006, 15.  
181 See Thom Shanker, “Army Will Reshape Training, With Lessons from Special Forces,” May 2, 2012, 
www.nytimes.com. As explained in the article, “The Army is reshaping the way many soldiers are trained and 
deployed, with some conventional units to be placed officially under Special Operations...” Shanker goes on to explain 
that “The impending changes reflect an effort to institutionalize many of the successful tactics adopted ad hoc from Iraq 
and Afghanistan.”  At the same time, fiscal austerity has also played a role in future investment. See Newsstand, “DoD 
Proposes Shrinking Ground Forces, Shunning Stability Ops.” Insidedefense.com, January 4, 2012. “The FY-13 budget 
request prepared in conjunction with the Obama administration’s new military strategy would shrink the Marine Corps 
to 182,000, permitting the service to spread the reduction over four years, in part by relying on funds from the overseas 
contingency account…Meanwhile, the FY-13 budget request aims to cut Army end strength from a force of 570,000 
today to roughly 480,000 to 490,000 within the five-year budget plan.”  
182 Originally quoted by Robert E. Lee at Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862. See Roy Blount, “Making 
Sense of Robert E. Lee,” Smithsonian Magazine, July 2003.  
183 Porch, Douglas. “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 22, 
no. 2, 15.  
184 United States Army, FM-3-24, Counterinsurgency, xxxvi 
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While salient, learning, adaptation, and innovation must continue in order for U.S. COIN 
efforts to serve national interests, when needed. Andrew Birtle provides credence, and 
thoughtfulness on this point in regard to thinking comprehensively about COIN within 
the context of its true nature:  
The great challenge is to find the right blend for a particular situation—a 
formulation that may well be different from that used at another time or 
place, even during the same conflict. Slogans like “politics are primary” 
are useful if they remind us that, in counterinsurgency as in all forms of 
war, military means must be subordinated to political ends, and that 
political and persuasive arts play a vital role in waging and resolving 
internal conflicts. They are less useful if they lead us into the mistaken 
belief that political considerations must trump military and security 
concerns at every turn, that coercion is necessarily antithetical to success, 
or that we must significantly rework a struggling society into one that is a 
mirror image of our own.185 
In this sense, COIN in the 21st century seems to correlate with Basil Williams’ 
description of the British Empire. Borrowing his concept and integrating it with COIN he 
may have said that:  COIN is as abnormal and incongruous an entity as it is to define or 
describe in the widest terms. It has never been the same from conflict to conflict, from 
century to century—either from extent, to regime types, to terrain and culture. It is not, 
however, possible to understand its present form without deciphering the common 
principles that define its nature through time; it can only be understood as a result of its 
previous history. Thanks to this vitality, no complete description of COIN and its 
principles will be possible.186 So far, the phenomenon remains resilient in its presence in 
human affairs. Its careful, honest study must continue. 
                                                 
185 Andrew Birtle, “Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Military Review 88, no. 4 (2008): 
52.  
186 Basil Williams, The British Empire. Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, no. 129 (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1928). See the Prefatory Note.  
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